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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM STATED 
Proressor Ross has well said that "the corner 
stone or sociology must be a sound doctrine or the social 
(1) 
forces ." While this is true sociolo~ists seem to 
be at lo~gerheads when it comes to making a stateMent 
of "the social forces". In purely scientific 
terms, "rorce", in the sense of the sufficient cause of 
phenomena, physical or social, Ir.ay be a misnomer·; but, 
if by "social rorces" we mean "the active factors in 
association", the expression may be allowed to stand for 
(2) 
want or a better term. Indeed, the terl!1 "force" is 
commonly applied and used in the physical sciences, and 
has been taken over by the social sciences as well. 
Since this is true, we will use the term "social rorces" 
as equivalent to "the active ractors in association", in 
our atterept to state what is basic in a scientific dis-
cuss10n or social life and institutions. 
(1 ). 
(2). 
At the present time sociolo~V is in a very unsettled 
E. a. Ross: Foundations or Sociolo~y, Macmillan, N. Y., 
1915, p. 181. . 
cr. B. G. Kena~y, "The Theory or the Social Forces·, 
in lhe Psy. Review, Vol. XXIV, p. ~76. 
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condition because there is little or no a~reement as to 
what constitutes the social rorces. But when we look 
back OTer the history or social philosophy we rind that 
there never has been unirormity in the statement or 
social rorces. Althou~h he was not the rirst social 
philosopher by at least twenty-three hundred years, 
Au~ust Comte was the rirst one to clearly set rorth 
sociolo~y as a science and to derine its scope and 
(1) 
limitations. While he made mistakes as any pioneer 
in science is bound to do, Comte did show that rundamental 
human institutions are lar~ely determined by man's 
instincts and reason. His psycholo~ical bases, however, 
surrered from the limitations of his a~e. For instance, 
he i~nored and belittled lo~ic, thinkin~ that the math-
ematical recording of obserTed phenomena could tell the 
~ 
whole story, when in reality, psychical phenorlena M of 
such a complex nature that ~ cannot be accurately 
measured in the same way as physical phenomena. 
Since Comte many sociologists haTe stressed now 
this and now that as Wthe social force w to the exclusion 
of other forces that n~y enter into the complex of social 
activity and social behaTior. Many more or less unilat-
eral theories have thus made their appearance; and 
(1). See Comte: Posit iTe PhilosopJ1Y, Book I, Ch. 1-2; 
and Dook VI; also Positive Polity, Vol. I, Ch. 1-2. 
because of this lack of a~reement amonl'; its adTocates, 
thinkers in the physical sctences haTe been inclined to 
insist that sociology is not a true science at all. soc-
iolo~y differs from the physical sciences in that it treats 
of the social life as a whole. As Professor Rllwood 
says, it is Wthe science which deals with the ori~in, 
development, structure and function of" the reciprocal 
(1) 
relations of indiTiduals. w It deals with the eTO-
lution and or~anization of our social life. Thus it is 
a science distinct fro~ the physical sciences, althou~h 
it may freely borrow from thenl at times. As a science 
it must haTe a solid foundation; and its corner stone, 
&s has been said, must be "a sound doctr:l.ne of the social 
forces" which make up the wreciprocal relations of 
indiTidualsw• 
In Tiew of the fact that there is lack of unison 
in re~ard to the statement of these social forces, a 
theoretical discussion of the social forces seems to be 
pertinent, and needs no apolo~y. It will be the task of" 
this paper to examine some of the Tarious theories that 
baTe been proposed as "the theory" of tl~ social forces; 
and to attempt, if possible, to set forth a sound and 
adequate theory of the social forces. 
This lack of uniformity amon~ sociolo~ists has led 
to many conflicts OTer metaphysical Tiews when science 
(1). C. a. Ellwood: An Introduction to Social Psycholo~y, 
D. appleton and Company, N. Y., 1917, p. 2. 
4 
really has no need or metaphysics at all, especially in 
the statement and workin~ out or its formulae and theorems. 
Ch!ef amon~ these metaphysical conflicts has been that of 
subjectivity versus objectivity. Some of the sUbjectivists 
in sociology, as we shall see, have attempted to reduce 
sociology to "feelin~ and "emotion". It must be 
~ranted that the use of subjective terms has at iimes 
been unwisely made in the past; yet this does not justify 
a negation of subjective terminolo~y alto~ether. In 
late years a school or "objectivists", in both sociolo~y 
and psychology, has made its appearance, wbict! claims 
that the old criterea of objectivity are not adequate. 
As Professor Ellwood has stated: "The adherents of this 
school assert that a fact for scientific purposes is not 
'anything in experience', but '80methin~ that can be 
observed', a happenin~ in the external world, which can 
and should be described without reference to individual 
psychic processes. These are the external behaviorists 
in psycholo~y, and those sociolo~ists who would describe 
everythin~ in the social life in terES of habit (foll~ay 
or custom) and environment. They find no place in social 
science (except perhaps provisionally) for such terms as 
feelin~, idea, belief, value, standard, mental attitude, 
. (1) 
mental interaction, and the like." The more radical 
among them would rule out all reference to individual 
(1). c. A. F.llwood: ObjectiviSM in Soeiolo~y, in Amer. 
Jour. of Socio., Vol. XXII, No. a, P. 289-290. 
psychic process as unscientific; while otbers would toler-
ate them as helpful in scientific description, but as 
havtng in1"erior scientific value, and. not to be used in 
describing behavior. This latter class predominates. 
The radical win~ 01" this school numbers very few thorou~h-
~oing objectivists. These would, however, reduce socio-
lo~y to a sort of collective physiolo~y; that is, they 
would sub8titute in the description of social processes 
the hypothetical activities of the cells of the central 
nervous system, which are as yet little understood, for 
(1 ) 
ways of thinking and feelin~ which we do understand. 
In otller words, in their ri~id psycho-physical parallelism 
they would reduce the description 01" human behavior to 
terms which would possibly be suft'ictent in describin~ the 
behavior 01" one of the lower Or~i:ini5ms. The main ob-
jection to be raised against this school is that they 1"ail 
to take cognizance of the 1"act that the behavior of man 
:Is much more complex than that of the lower organisms, 
because of the part which mind plays in determinin~ the 
behavior of man. The less radical objectivists would 
make use of subjective terminolo~y wben it suits their 
convenience, althou~h they re~ard it as unsc1entit'ic. In 
other words, it seems that they are at a loss when it COIIW'!S 
to explaining all 80cial pheno~ena in objective terms, 
and .would make use of subjective terms wben the latter are 
(1). See Ellwood, ibid, pp. 20~~2n2. 
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(1) 
more conTenient. While an objectiTe treatment is 
desirable in sociolo~y in so rar as it is possible; yet 
our ignorance or the neural Correlates or such subjective 
racts as "desire", "opinion", "Talue", "standards", "ideas", 
etc., makes it impossible to speak altogether in objectiTe 
terms. As much objectiTity as it is possible to obtain 
is desirable in sociolo~, but an obJectiTity that rules 
out all subjectiTe rererence is both undesirable and 
inexpedient. On the other hand, a thorou~h-~oin~ sub-
jectivity is also undesirable, ror when conscious pro-
cesses are spoken or their neural correlates must always 
be included. 
The objectivists, ror the most part, hold a passiTe 
Tiew or human nature. They hold that the indiTidual is 
by nature inert and does not act until some external 
cause or stimulus compels him to act. It is the sense 
impressions tbrou~h stimuli rrom the environment which 
cause him to act. Thus the complex behavior or the 
individual is to be interpreted by "the law or association 
(2) 
or ideas and sensations". The nervous system is re-
~arded as merely a system or conductors. The stimuli 
rroDI the enTironment act upon the receptor-organs or 
conductors, and initiate there a series of or~anic process-
(1). See Ellwood, ibid. p. 292-293. 
(2). See Ellwood: An Introduction to Social ~sycholo~y, 
p. 52. 
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es. Dehavior must, therefore, always be explained by 
the action of these external stimuli, or the way in which 
these stimuli associate with other stimuli already receiv-
ed hy the nervous system. The indi~idual thus becomes 
the slave of his environment. This passive view of the 
objectivists cannot stand in the li!;ht of the develop-
rnent of modern physical science. Biolo~y, especially, 
liaR shown that spontaneity or self-activity is charac-
(1) 
teristic of livin,r organisms. The subjectivists, 
on the other hand, hold to a more active view of hu~n 
nature. They believe that the mind is the chief instru-
ment of association, and that its main function has been 
to adapt the individual to the life of the group through 
what Professor Ellwood calls "communication, suggestion, 
. (2) 
imitation, aympathy - in brief, mental interaction." 
The subjectivists hold further that while the stimuli 
from without may function in causing action, the mind also 
functions in the selection of what stimuli amonrr several 
(1). L. T. Bobhouse says: "The revolution in biolo~ical 
theory will be found, as time ~oes on, to have 
invested the constitution of the living organism, 
as a~ainst the environing conditions, with a new 
importance; and in this constitution the fundamen-
tal fact everywhere is that the living bein~ is not 
passive, but active, not mechanical in its reaction 
to things, but assertive, plastic, and, in a measure 
proportioned to it. developnent, self-determinin~." 
(Wind in Evolution, Revised Edition). See also, 
J. A. Thomson: Heredity, p. 172. 
(2). Ellwood, Ope cit., p~ 57. 
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sh~11 be acted upon. Civilized man lives in an ideational 
rather than a perceptual world. Furthermore, the soc io-
psychic process, which we may call "the social mind", has 
been gradually evolvin~ ever since human culture be~an, 
and any attempt to try- to interpret that social life in 
(1) 
purely objective terms would be pract1.cally impossible. 
To quote Professor Ellwood a~ain, "a purely objective 
statement of social processes would in practice lead to 
a denial of the importance, in the social life, of cen-
trally initiated psycho-neural processes in the individual. 
The existence of such centrally initiated processes seems 
beyond question in psycholo~y. To describe them in 
purely physical or phys10lo~1cal terms would be of no 
advanta,:e to the social sciences, since the names for 
their psychic correlates are much better known and under-
stood. In practice, objectivism in the sociul sciences 
would mean simply some form of physical environment deter-
(2) 
minism." 
Another conflict that has to some extent a~itated 
sociolo~ical ranks is that or monism versus pluralism 
in connection with the social forces. Like instincts, 
social forces have been added to and subtracted from 
almost at will. Professor Hayes has even ~one so rar as 
to deny that there is a concept of force at all, althou~h 
( 1) • 
(2). 
See Ilu~o Munsterber~: P.ycholo~y: General and Applied, 
pp. 26~-269. 
C. A. Ellwood: An Introduction To Social Psycholo«y, 
(Preface), pp. 6-7. 
9 
he admits that there is a ~eneral metaphysical concept of 
(1) 
power. In occupying this position, Professor 
Hayes is a monist, and has carried the discussion over 
into metaphysics. In a recent article, Proressor 
Dewey has well said, "henceforth, it is, pure wilrulness 
if anyone pretendin~ to a scientific treatment starts 
(2) 
f"rom any other than a plural1.stic basis." In other 
words, social forces are many and not one; they are 
plural and not singular. We cannot reduce the social 
forces to anyone particular force; neither can we stress 
some one particular force to the exclusion of other forces 
witheut bein~ false to true scientific ·procedure. To ~et 
at an adequate theory of the social forces a synthetic 
view of the many social forces which ~o to make up the 
reciprocal relations of individuals is necessary. 
A third conf"lict which has prevailed in socio-
lo~ical thou~ht bas been that between a metaphysical 
and a scientif"ic procedure. In t he main the soc:l.al 
sciences, more especially those ot a theoretical nature, 
have been, and still remain today, in the real~ ot opinion 
rather than in the realm of accurate and verified scien-
tif"ic truth. They have been developed in the service 
of pet theories, social, metaphysical, methodolo~ical 
and political. In other words, sociolo~y aJ:lon~ other 
(1). 
(2). 
E. C. Hayes: "The Social Forces Error", Amer. Jour. 
of Socio., Vol. XVI, pp. 61~-614. 
John Dewey: "The Need of Social PsycholoJ!:y", Psychol. 
Review, 1917, Vol. XXIV, p. 269. 
• 
1U 
social sciences, has suffered much from metaphysical spec-
ulat,ions an(l methodolol'.:ical fads. This tendency has 
been one of the most serious impediments to the develop-
(1) -
ment of social science. This is contradictory to a 
true scientific method, for science is not at all concern-
ed with metaphysics. Indeed science must begin with a 
passion for facts, is characterized by clearness of vision, 
cautiousness of statement, and hy a sense of the inter-
(2) 
relatedness of things. The work of metaphysics be~1ns 
only where that of the experimental sciences leaves off. 
It matces no careful and accurate search for facts, check-
ing them up by experiment and observation. It has a 
place only in '1uestionin~ the hypotheses of the experimen-
tal sciences, and their conclusions and formulae. In 
other words, sC tence is not concerned ,,1 tI) metaphys ics 
at all, arId is in no sense dependent upon it. Thus a 
sound and adequate scientific method is imperative for the 
social sciences, and for sociolo~y in particular. Science 
is not built upon any lmivt'!rsal, .!. priori hypothesis. The 
spirit and method of scicnc~ is matter-of-fact, inductive 
(:'1) 
and pra.~matlc, and. not deductive and dogmcltic. Therefore, 
any adequate social theory must be inductive and practical. 
It must preserve the point of view, and utilize the results 
(1 ). 
(2). 
(3). 
c. A. Ellwood: "The Present Condition of the ~octal 
sciences", Science, Vol. XLVI, No. 1194, p. 470. 
J. A. Thomson: ~n Introduction to Science, p. 34. 
Ibid, pp. 30-:18. 
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of the natural sciences, and lltdld upon th ·~m as 1.ts basis. 
As Professor Elhfood says, "if there is any hope of the 
social sciences t!:ettin~ beyond the stage of mere socially 
approTed opinions, and of cominl!: to substantial al!:ree-
Ment on funda~ental issues, it must be throu~h basing 
themselves upon the established results of antecedent 
(1) 
sc1.ences, particularly of biology and psycholo~y." 
Sociolo~y, in particular, must be largely based upon the 
scientific results of biology and psycholo~y, and not at 
all upon metaphysical speculations. It must use the 
statistical, the historical, and the survey methods of 
research, and present facts, not theories, for the rruidance 
of the social thinker ani the social worker. Thus th~ 
conflict between the metaphysical and th~ scientific 
method of procedure must end in the total ne~ation of the 
for~er to the entire supre~acy of the latter. 
Let us now exaMine some of the Tarious unilateral 
sociolo<?:ical theories th.1t hetTe been proposed and adTo-
cated. We will first examine the theories of a few 
thinkers in the so-called "psychical" school. 
One of the pioneer sociologists in this country was 
Lester Ward, who was one of the first to attempt to de-
fine the social forces. He proposed a psychical theory, 
contemine; that "the forces producing social phenomena 
are the social forces, and, ta'cen to~ethcr they constitute 
(1). C. A. Ellwood, Ope cit., p. -172. 
-e 
1 ') .. 
(1) 
the dynamic agent", which he reduced entirely to reeling. 
lie says, to ~ive a few citations from his works, "the 
(2) 
dynamic agent consists wholly of reelin~;" "Feeling is a 
true cosmic force •••• and constitutes the propellin~ 
(1) 
agent in man and animals." "In the associatc(l state 
(4) 
of men, it (feelin~) is the true social force." "ihe 
thinking faculty is not a force; but feeling is a true 
force and its various manifestations constitute the 
(5) 
social forces." Ward was entirely too subjective 
and utterly failed to recognize such objective factors 
as environment, geo~raphic and economic, as well as the 
biological factors of heredity and variation. Furth~rmore , 
Ward was a hedonist and held the view that assigns to 
feeling the function of a primary force, which lies back 
of instinctive activity. He regarded all action, 
whether individual or social, as explainable on a basis 
of pleasure and pain. nis psychical theory of the 
. social forces is to be summarily dismissed as one-sided 
and inaccurate. 
Ratzenhofer made a similar mistake, only he sub-
stituted the term "interest" for force. He thought that 
there were riv~ r.nrtq of interest which ~vern the social 
life of mankind: ( 1) The race interest, i.e., the iM-
pulqes which center in the reproductive functions; (2) the 
(1). Ward: Pure Sociolo~y, p. 256. 
(~). Ibid, p. 256. 
(~). Ibid, p. 1n. 
(4). Ibid, p. 101. 
(5). Ward: Psychic Factors in Givl1lzation, pp. 51-54. 
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physiolo~ical interest, i.e·, hunger and thirst; (3) the 
egotic interest, i.e., the entire circle of self-re~ard-
ing motives; (4) the social interest; and (5) the trans- ()) 
ccndcntal interest, which creat~s reli~ion and philosophy. 
Professor Small classifies human cravin .~s as desires for 
health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty and rl~ht­
(2) 
ness. This is nothin~ more or less than a simpli-
fication of Ratzenhofer. This is all ri~lt so far as 
it goes, but it surely is not adequate as a c1ac;siflcation 
of the social forces. The social force8 cannot be 
liMited or reduced to "interests· or "desires"; and such 
classifications as those above made deserve the criticism 
which has so fully been bestowed upon them. 
Professor. Baldwin liJlJits his derinition to "only 
those p~ychical products, called desires, whiCh influence 
(3) 
individuals in their social relations". Such a deri-
nition is, of course, faulty like the on~s already noticed 
for similar reasons. In the classification ~iven by 
Professor aoss we have a slight advance, and it seems to 
be a sort of combination of the views of Ward, nat7.enhofer, 
Small and Baldwin. Professor Ross regards desire as the 
primal force. He divides desires into (1) Natural; 
(1) 
and (2) Cultural. He makes room ror l1ractically all of 
the psychical factors, such as the impulses, instincts, 
(1). Ratzenhofer: Sociolo~ische Erkenntniss, pp. 54-66. 
(2). Small: General ~ociolo~y, eh. XIV and X~~I. 
(:l). Baldwin: Social and Ethical Interpretd.tions, p. 484. 
( ,1). Ross: Foundations of Sociolo~y, pp. 169 ff. 
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emotions, intellectual eleMents, etc. Ross thilllcs 
that there are certain values which accompany the 
satisfaction of" a number of" wants. These he re~arUs as 
weal th, ~overnrnent, )"cligion and knowledt!;e; and th~y in 
turn give orf impulses which rningle and forM the econorlic, 
political, reli~ious and intellectual int~rests which, be 
regards as the chief forces that make up the content of 
history. He does not consider that these are in them-
selvcR social forces, but that they flow out or these 
others enumerated above. In a word, Ross regards that 
th~ psychical are the only factors to be regarded as 
social forces, and thus he follows Ward in his unilateral 
error. In closine his discussion of the social 
forces, Ross says, th~t "the corner stone of sociolo~y 
(1) 
must be a sound doctrine of the social forces". To 
tIlts we heartily a~ree, but surely Ross has not ~tven us 
4 sound doctrine. 
The theory of the biolo~ical 8chool 1s that blood, 
ri4ce and heredity account for all diff"erences f"ound 
among mankind. Tn other words, it is the "stock-breeder's" 
theory of" society. This Tie" has berm championed by 
(2) (:J) 
such writers as H. S. Chamberlain and Madison Grant; but ( .1) 
its most radic~l adTocate was Count ArthUr de Goblneau. 
Ills fundamental thesis was tha.t there is no otber force in 
the history of man than the "chemistry of races". He 
11). Hoss, ibid, p-:-i81. 
(2). Foundations or" the Nineteenth Century. 
(:1). The Pass111~ of"~Great naoe. 
(4). An EBsay upon the Inequality of the Human llaces. 
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makes practically everything connected with manldnd 
depend upon racial purity. So long as a race 1s pure, 
he thinks, it '"ill have like-m1ndedness; but deterioration 
rollows when intermixture takes place. De Gohineau goes 
on to state that law, government and ~orality have no 
inrluence upon civilization. He says that neither phy-
sical environment-, moral austerity or laxity, good or bad 
government, reli~ion, piety, or godliness has any signi-
ricance ror the history of a people, but only the purity 
or mixtUre of its blood c~n count. Such a view is, of 
course, extreme and simply discredits itself. Race is 
unquestionably a factor as a social force, but is only one 
or many factors. All human culture is an acquired trait 
and is capable of bein~ taken up by all races and assimi-
lated by all races. 
The theory and ar~uMent of the eugenicists, of 
course, stresses heredity as the Most important factor 
in social life. When this is not carried to extremes, 
as it is in any "stock-breeder's" theory of society, 
it 1s to be ~iven due consideration. It is, however, 
not to be regarded as the social force, but as only one of 
the rDelny social forces. Other biolo!;lcal forces are 
varicltion am. selection, which with heredity help to give 
the organism what it has to start with; but they are not 
to be thoue:ht of as the sole factors in association. 
The environmental school, like the psychical schonl, 
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has been large, and h~s mainly stressed the ~eographic 
and economic environm~nt to the exclusion, or practi-
cally to the exclusion, or the biolol!:ical and 'Psychical 
factor!'J. One of the most one-sided of the ~eon:raphi-
cal determinists was Tbomas Buckle, who held that climate, 
soil, food, and what he termed "the external aspect of 
Nature", are the primary and ultimate causes of human 
(t) 
proe;ress. This Tiew of Bucklets will be more fully 
dtscussed in another place, so it will be sufficient 
here to say that it, like most of the preceding theories, 
is to be rejected because of its glaring fault of one-
sidedness. 
Karl Marx, "ho may be taken as an example of ·the 
economic determinists, h~ld that economic considerations 
dominate the entire life of ~ankind. To state it in 
his own words, "the sum total of these relations of pro-
dUction constitutes the er.onomic structure of society -
tIle real foundation, on which rise legal and. political 
superstructures, and to which correspond definite forms 
of social consciousness. The mode of production in 
material lire determines the general choiLracter of the 
social politics and spiritual process of life. It is not 
the consciousness of men thi4t determines their existence; 
but, on the contrary, their social existence determines 
their consciousness. At a certain stage of the ir deTel-
opment the material forces of" production in society 
come in conflict wi th the exist tn .~ relat ions of produc-
rt). Buckle: Uistory of CITil{~ati()n In England. 
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tinn, or with the property relation within which they haT~ 
been at work before. From forMs or deTelopment of the 
forces of production these relations tUrn into their 
(1) 
fetters." Again, such a crassly materialistic 
yiew of society merely seryes to -:iiscount itself. The 
economic factors are to be regarded as important, to be 
sure, but like the geo~raphic factors are only one of 
a set of factors that go to make up the complex whole 
of the social forces. 
A new school of sociologists has arisen which aims 
at the same objectiYity in the social sciences as exists 
in the natural sctencps. These are known as the "object-
ivi8ts" • They hold, for the most part, that a fact is 
not a fact unless it is somethin.e; that can be observe(l, 
that is, it is nothtn~ in experience. The more extreme 
among them would rule out all reference to individual 
psychic processes in scientiric description. Thus they 
find no place in social science ror Buch subjective terms 
as "feelin.e;", "idea", "belief", "values", and the like. 
The radical objectivists in sociolo~y have been 
few in number. One of the first to become prominent in 
sociolo,'!';Y was ~nile Durkhcim, but he was only half-he .. rted 
in his rejection of psycholo~y. As an objectivist, he 
defines a fact as whateyer impresses itself upon obserYa-
tion, a~l not as somethin~ in exp~rience. He regards 
(1). Marx: Critique of Political Economy, (Preface p. 5). 
, . / - ~ 
. ( 
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that if soclolosY Is to becom~ truly scl~ntiflc social 
racts must be treated as somethin~ apart from conscious-
(1) 
ness. In ract, sociolo~y lIas no concern f'or individ-
ual cOQsciousness ~t all, ror the individual is determined 
by the "social milieu" in which he exists. Hence socio-
(2) 
lo~y should not be bas~d upon psycholo~y at all. The 
explanation of social phenomena, according to uurkheim, 
mUst be sou~ht in the a~~regate of its mass, and not in 
the characteristics or its component units. A social 
fact is determined hy a preTiou5 social fact, but not in 
(:1 ) 
Any individual state of consciousness. Thus DUrkhp.im 
holds to the hypothesis of a social mind, which is to be 
regarded as the ori~in of all social processes of impor-
tance. Instead of going on to construct a sociology in 
terms of the behavior complexes of the a~~re~ate and its 
environment, he takes into account such collectiTe repre~ 
sentcltions as public opinion, popular belieY, social tra-
ditton, popular will, and the like. For Durkheim these 
are social facts, although somethin~ entirely different 
from biological and psycholo~ical facts, for they are factA 
exterior to the individual. This objectivism is worse 
than the subjectivism which he attempts to aToid. It is 
really a metaphysiccll conception, for there can be no social 
facts apart from, and as distinct from, the biolo~ical and 
Psycholo~ical. Thus DUrkheiTIJ is not at all thorout!h-
11). ETlJil~ Durkl'clm: Les regles de la methode sociolo~lque. 
(2). Ibid., Ch. V. (Ch. II) 
(1). Ibid, p. 115. 
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e:oin~ in his objectivism ani ends in a metaphysical suh-
j~ctivism far worse than that which be starts out to 
refute. 
A more thorou!;h-$!;oin,2: objectivism is found in the 
view of Dr. G. P. Zeliony, a docent in physiolo~y in the 
(1) 
University of Petro;!!;rad. Zf>liony attempts to apply 
the natural science method to sociolo~y. The analYRis 
of obserTed phenomena will ~ive us material that can be 
Used for further InTesti~ation. Soclolo~y, ,Ilccordintl; to 
Zeliony, must as in natural science, first, undertake 
the description of phenomena ~nd the discovery of new 
phenomena; and second, it must deduce the relations of 
law between them. Zeliony thinks that the psychic side 
must be left untouched if a clear, scientific conception 
of social phenomena is to be obtained. Consciousness 
has no place in a scientific description of phenomena, for 
we cannot know the content of other minis than our own. 
In the explanation of a phenomena the causal connection 
with other phenonena must be established; and since 
psychic states are not aTailable for obserTation, their 
connection with the physical effect upon the or~aniHm 
offers no real explanation. Zeliony insists that we 
mUst ~et rid of the conception that man is a psyc11o-physl-
cal organism, and that he must be re~ardeu. as an organism 
(1). The summary of Zeliony's Tiews is taken from a 
paper by C. A. Ellwood, Amer. J. of Socio., XXII, 
No. ~, pp. 291-101. zeliony's ori~inal paper may 
be found in the ArchiT fur Rassen und Gesellschafts-
Biolo~ie, IX, 405-4~O. 
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pure and simple without reference to mind at all. 
Zeliony declares that the true sociolo~ist does 
not know the conception denoted by the words "marriage", 
"crime", "family", etc. Assassination is for him 
merely th~ killing of one person by another under cer-
tatn objectiTe circumstances. A man raises his hand 
to strike another; but the only possible scient.lflc explan-
ation of this phenoMenon is one that establishes the 
connection between the raisin~ of th~ hand and the phy-
oical and physiolo~ical antecedents. What goes on in 
consciousness in connection with that action does not 
concern the scientist, for the conception of conscious-
. 
ness cannot haTe a place:; a scientific designation of a 
natural phenomenon. The scientist has no right to 
explain human phenomena by, or take refu~e in, the mind. 
~eliony's do~matic objectiTism is to be seriously 
re.cted al!';ainst. It implies the denial of any cause 
outside of existin~ material causes. Although the mech-
anistic conception of life is merely a workin~ hypothesis 
workable within certain limits and aTailable only for the 
s04ution of certain problems; yet here in Zellony we 
find it WOTen into a do~ of uniT~rsal application. 
This ultra-scientific doctrine cannot be accept~d by the 
sociolo~ists for, as ~rofessor Ellwood says, "CiTilized 
man liTes in an ideational world. For hi" the world of 
real objects is lar~ely replaced by a world of ideas, 
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standards, v·alues •••••• Human history~ thus presents it-
self as a ~rowin~ tradition, or wsocial mind" which 
(1) 
cannot be understood apart from its content." 
Zeliony holds that there are two kinds of compli-
cated relations existing between the animal org.ni~m and 
the environment. There is, first, the interaction of 
the organism and the environment which follows from 
reflection, throue;h the intervention of the nervous sys-
tern as the result of the outer world acting on the sense 
or~a~s. Secondly, there is the non-reflective influence 
which is not entirely dependent upon the nervous system. 
A reflex action of an or~anism is due to an exchange of 
excitation of an in~oin~ nerve with an out~oing nerve 
throu~h the nervous system of the organism. .All of 
these together constitute "behavior". It may be true, 
Zeliony thinks, that these reactions really have their 
cause in psychic processes, but for the scientist the 
cause lies in the mechanical proces~es of' the nervous sys-
tern, i.e., the reflexes. Thus Zeliony would reduce soc-
iolo~y to the physiolo~ical behavior of organisms without 
regard for the psychic processes at all. It must be 
objected here that our knowled~e of the nervous system 
and its activity is 80 absolutely insufficient that we 
cannot SUbstitute in our description of social processes 
the hypothetical activities of the central nervous 
system which have not yet been observed for ways of 
(1). Ellwood: ubjectivIsm in Sociology, p. ~02. 
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(1) 
thinlc:in~ and feeling which we well understand. In 
other words, "the social mind~ cannot be understood 
apart from its content; i.e., the ideas, values and 
standards which compose it. 
Furthermore, when Zeliony asserts that the psy-
chic life of others is unavailable for scientific inves-
ti~ation, he is inconsistent with the true state of 
arrairs. We can know the opinions and beliefs or· 
others as rully and accurately as we know many physical 
objects. We are intuitively and directly conscious 
or the conscious states of others, as much so as we are 
of the qualities of physical objectR. Throu~h the re-
~earch of experimental psychology, methods have been 
devised whereby individual psychic processes may be sub-
jected to some measure of scientific control, and the con-
tent of other minds may thus be known to us. Through the 
use of the survey method in soctolo~y we can know the 
opinions, beliefs and standards of men in the mass just 
as fully as we can know physical objects in the mass. 
Because of these facts we must flatly contradict these 
assertions of Zeliony. Moreover, the physiological soc-
iolo~y which Zeliony advocates is inadequate and insuffi-
cient to explain the more complex behavior of man, whether 
this behavior be that or the individual, or of the group. 
For the present, the proper scientific procedure is to 
rtesoribe Bocillil phenomenl4 partly in objective, ani partly 
Tl). EllwoOd, Ope cIt., p. - ~o1. 
21 
in subjective terms; i.e., explain it in objective terms 
when we are sure of our ~round, and in· subjective terms 
when the phenomena is psychical, and the neural correla-
tes are insl~ficiently known to ~ive an objective descrip-
tion. 
These one-~ided sociolo~ical views that we have 
been discussin~ show us how necessary it is to obtain 
a synthetic view if we are to have an adequate theory of 
the social forces. The majority of sociologists, however, 
have not been fair to the set of factors which they have 
attempted to defend. Professor lllackmar marks an 
advance. He regaroy the social forces as the activities 
of the or~anized social body, those that arise from 
within and are essentially a part of its activity. He 
says that, "the real social forces are those that arise 
from the individual (iesires and the action of the social 
mass. These are the forces that are inherent in the 
social organism and which act in the process of social 
. (1) 
evolution." · Hence his emphasis is, of course, upon 
the Psychical factors. But in addition to the individ-
ual desires and instincts, he reco~nizes the operation 
of the forces of nature that influence society, such as 
climate, the water supply, food, shelter, clothing, and 
the natural resources. lie adds as a third set of social 
forces, those which arise from the mass, such as the social 
mind, social judgment, and conscious social control. 
(1). Blackmar: Elements of Sociolo~y, ~p. 21R-21n. 
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These are also psychical factors. Blackmar. must be crit-
icized because he seems to ignore the biological factors 
of heredity, variation, selection, etc, which are also 
to be regarded as social factors. }t'urt he rmore, he 
places entirely too much emphasis upon the desires and 
instincts, and ends in an entirely too subjective treat-
ment of sociolo~y. 
Professor Ellwood has given an admirable classifi-
cation of what he re,;ards as "the original active factors 
in humun association". He divides them into: (1) The 
physical factors, by which he means geographic and economic 
environment - the environMental factors in toto; and the 
biolo~ical factors of heredity, variation and selection. 
His emphasis, however, is on (2), the psychical factors, 
which he regards as the impulses, feelin~s and intellectual 
(1) 
elements. While Professor Ellwood places great emphasis 
upon the psychical factors, for the most part be is fair 
in his treatment of the environmental factors. lIe states 
that "over long stretches of time, the geographical fac-
tors of climate, ·food and soil, and the biological factors 
of heredity, variation and selection, seem the signifieant 
factors. At any given moment, however, the influence of 
these physical factors expresses itself in the social 
life through the impulses, feclin~s, and ideas of individ-
uals; for it is only throu~h these psychological elements 
(2) 
that any kim of' social life is maintained." Thus he re-
(1). EllwoOd: An IntrOduction to Social PSYChology, p. 76 (2). Ibid, p. 76. 
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J!:ards that the physical factors furnish the raw material 
with which the psychical factors must work; and in large 
measure his view is synthetic. He violently reacts 
against the environMentalists and objectivists, however, 
and at times seems a little unfair in his treat~ent of 
these other factors, which must be given due emphasis if 
an adequate theory of the social forces is to be arrived 
at in a truly scientific way. 
The task of this essay will be to attempt to 
present a trUly synthettc view of the social forces. This 
to be successfully done must avoid, wherever possible, 
metaphysical assumptions in order that a scientific state-
ment may be made. While at times metaphysical implica-
ttons cannot be avoided, metaphysical assumptions; at 
least, can be avoided. In many of the theories that 
we have examined above metaphysical assumptions have bulk-
ed large, espeCially in the theories of those who would 
deny that sociololQ' is in any way based upon psycholo2;Y. 
Some of them would go so far as to say that in the tropis~~ 
tic explanation of' the nervous behavior of plant and ani:-" . . 
mal organisms we have all of the consciousness that it Is 
possible to get, If, indeed, there is a concept of con-
sciousness at all. We will endeavor, however, to follow 
the better sociolo~jcal am psycholo'!;ical usage in the 
matter; and a caref'ul investigation into the physical 
factors that function as "social forces" will unquestion-
ably show that not only do psycholo~y and biolo~y fur-
nish helpful explanations of social phenomena, but that 
sociolo~y is directly deperxlent upon them. 
FUrthermore, we will endeavor to follow the scien-
tific method which has but little concern for metaphysi-
cal assumptions. Metaphysical assuMptions merely serve 
to cloud the issue, Tor when the platn man speaks of 
conscious processes and the like, · he does not think at 
all of their metaphysical explanations. Let us see 
what the scientific procedure has been in the past, and 
What it now is in the present. Before the evolution of 
science man's relations with nature were predominantly 
practical. Amn is practlcal, emotional and scientific. 
The practical man's trend is toward doin~ and not toward 
knowln~. In fact science arose out of a direct response 
to actual needs. Man is also emotional; i.e., he has a 
love for the beautiful, for the aesthetic. The scien-
tific man has elected primarily to know. He does not 
directly seek, like the practical ~an, to realize the 
ideal of exploitln~ nature and controllin~ life. He 
seeks rather to idealize, to conceptualize the real, or 
kt least those aspects of reality that are aTailable in his (1 ) 
experience. The scientific man is certainly far from 
beinp; metaphysic .. l; he cares nothing for speCUlation. lie 
is more concerned with knowing nature than of enjoying 
. (1). See thomson: An Introduction to Science, ch. I. 
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her. He attempts to reduce the processes of nature to 
the simplest possible rules and formulas in order to ~et a 
working hypothesis for the world of practical experience. 
As Professor Karl Pearson says: "The scientific man has 
above all things to strive at self-elimination in his 
judgments, to provide an ar~ument which is as true for 
each individual mind as for his own. The classification 
of facts, the reco~nition of their sequence and relative 
significance, is the function of science, and the habit 
of forntin~ a jllllgl'lent upon these facts, unbiased by 
personal feelings, is cha.ra.cteristic of lfhat may be termed 
(1) 
the scientific frame of mind." 
Thus in sociology, one, if he is to have a sound 
scientific method, must be willin~ to listen to su~e:estions 
but determined to judge for himself. An hypothesis 
should not be formed until arter accurate ani reli41ble 
facts have been ascertained and carefully worked out. 
Furthermore, the sociolo~ist must have clearness or vision 
if he is to have an adequate knowled~e of the workin~s of 
society, either of the social mind, or of the behavior or 
the social ~roup. AS Dr. Thomson says: "The scien-
tific mind is especially marked by a passion for facts, by 
cautiousness of statement, by a clearness of vision, and 
by a sense of the . inter-relatedness of things. It is con-
trasted with the emotional or artistic m60d, and with the 
practical mood, but the three form a trinity (knowing, 
(1). The Grammar of Science, p. o. 
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feelin~, doin~), which should he unified in ,every normal 
(1) 
life. " 
Thus science has no business whatever in starting 
with metaphysical distinctions, for they have no place in 
scientific statement or scientific method. Science 
states the: facts and attempts to discover formulae or 
laws which control the obscrTation of phenomena, and what 
it cannot explain it leaves untouched. The work of 
metaphysics begins only where the work of experimental 
science leaves off. Metaphysics is not concerned with 
careful and accurate search for facts and their verifica-
tion. It only questions the hypotheses of the exper1-
mental sciences, their conclusions and formulae, not with 
any intention of disprovln~ them, but rather in an attem~t 
to ~et at what is or is not real existence, or reality. 
Metaphysics is not concerned with the acquisition of facts, 
but rather with their explanation and interpretation; 
while science is directly concerned with facts, and cares 
little for their interpretation. Science is not concerned 
with metaphysics at all, and is not in the least dependent 
upon it; while, on the other ham, metaphysics is absolute-
ly dependent upon scientific fact and discovery. For 
eXample, it is the business of the scientific anthropolo-
gist to discover all that he can of prehistoric man that 
light may be thrown upon the problems of anthropology. 
lie d1.p.;s down through layer arter layer of ~eolo~ical strata 
and unearths the remains or the Neanderthaloid type or man, 
(1). Thomson: An Introduction to Science, p. 34. 
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to~ether with his cultural implements and weapons. By the 
aid of definite formulas and laws he records the facts 
in the case. By using the laws of Turiation, heredity 
and isolation, he traces out the evolution or man from 
this primitive type or bein~ to Man as he now is. But 
the scientist cannot indulge in metaphysical speculation 
if he is to be true to science. His conclusions must be 
absolutely checked up by facts ascertained throu~h analo~y, 
induction and deduction. None of these three methods 
can he Used alone, but all must be synthettzed if a 
reasonably scientific conclusion is to be arrived at. 
Thus we see that science, if it is to re~ain 
sCience, cannot start with metaphysical assumptions; yet 
it seems that some sociolo~ists and psychologists resort 
to at least metaphysical implications. To illustrate 
this point, let us take the case of a ~an walking along 
(1) 
a road. lIe sees a broken wire, and he stops because 
the "idea" of dan~er presents itsp-If, as the functional-
1st would say. The mechanist would say that the sit!:ht 
of the wire and. the act of stoppin.!; are the neural corre-
lates of the "idea" of dan~er, but that the "idea" of dan-
~er does not , cause the man to stop. This latter explan-
ations seems to have at least a m~taphysical implication, 
since the mechanist must admit that the "idea" of dan~er 
was there whether or not the npural correlates furnished 
the cause. In this case, however, when the mind was 
fl). A. P. Weiss: Relation Detween Functional I4nd Behilvior 
Psycholo~y, Psy. ReT., Vol. XXIV, pp. :JOO 1'1'. 
informed of the broken wire, and the "idea" of danger was 
forr.1ed, it (the mind.) actually functioned in causin~ or 
dete ... t:linin~ behavior. While the functionalist would 
state that the function of perception is to control ac-
tion; i.e., the mental process determines behavior; on the 
other hand, the behaviorist hol(ls that it is the neural 
correlate that controls behavior, i.e., the st:lmuli from 
the outside environment determine what the behavior is to 
be. If this is not metaphysical reasonin~, what in the 
world is it? 
When the plain man speaks of conscious processes, 
such as thOllf!:ht or feelin~,he never dreams of separatin,!; 
them from the brain processes that are involved. To 
speak of "the neural correlates" of consciousness, or of 
behavior, means nothin~ to him. In fact no one makes 
such distinctions save the psycholo~ist who does it in a 
methodological way, or the metaphysician who does it to 
Meet and to solve his problems. Then why should not the 
sociolo~lst be permitted to make use of subjective termin-
olo.e;y, such as "ideas", "beliefs", "standards" and "val ues", 
since he does not know their physiological or objective 
e~uivalents or correlates? 
With this statement of the problem, and a determina-
tion to avoid metaphysical assumptions which render the 
lise of a scientific method difficult, if not imposl'iible, 
let us proceed with our inquiry into the statement am. 
theory of the social forces. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ORGil~TS~1 AND ENVIHONMENT 
(ENVIRONMENT~\.L F ACTOHS) 
The influence of the environmental ractors in 
sociolo~y is important. The environ~ent plays a ~reat 
part, althou~h not the whole part, as we shall endeavor 
to show. By the environMental ractors is meant the 
total inrluencc or the enTironrnent, both economic and 
~eol!:raphip. Heredity furnishes the or~anism what it has 
to start with; the psychical factors rurnish it with the 
means of developing and expandin~ its li~e; while the 
environment rurnishes the raw material with which it must 
work. This does not necessarily mean that the or~anism 
must be the slave ~f its enTironment, but rather that the 
environment lar~ely molds and determines what the plastic 
nature of the indiTidual shall develop into. To some 
de~ree, the life of the lower or~anisms exclusive of man 
is almost wholly determined by their environment; while 
man is not. Our inquiry will be extended larl!:ely in 
the direction of the place that the environmental ~actors 
have in the determination or man's deTclopment, espeCially 
in its more 80cial aspects. 
The geographical env ironment, by which is me ant 
the action of such forces as food, soil, cli~ate, 
natural resources, topography, etc', upon the organism, 
has had considerable influence in tJ1e formation of human 
societies and human associations. This has, however, 
been entirely overemphasized by such one-sided writers 
as Buckle, who contended that climate, soil, food, and 
what he termed "the external aspects of nature", are 
the primary causes of human progress, indeed the ulti~ate 
(1) 
causes. He says that "the general aspect of 
Nature produces its principal results by exciting the 
irna~inat10n and by sUf'"gesting those innurnerall1e super-
stitions which are the great obstacles to advancing 
(2) 
knowledge. " Thus mountainous districts, or 
countries, cannot produce poets because the external 
aspect of nature is so great that those residing there 
can have no i~agination. In mountainous countries 
natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tempests, 
hurricanes, pestilences, etc., are so frequent and 
dlsastriou8 that they affect the imagination of an 
ignorant and superstitious people. Hence, Buckle 
contends that in countries where these phenomena take 
place the ci~ilization of the people is invariably 
inferior to what it is in countries where such phenomena 
are absent, or at least infrequent. Then Buckle 
(1). Thomas Buckle: The History of Civilization in England. (2). Ibid, p. 29. 
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comes to the sweeT'in~ generali7.ation that such phenomena 
are generally a.bsent in Europe, and present in non-
European countries, and hence the conclusion follows 
that the fundamental dlvision of human history to be 
made is between the civilization of Europe and tllat 
which is non-European. It is, he argues, because in 
Europe man is stronger than nature, and elsewhere 
nature is stronger than man. Such ""eogranhical 
d eterl'linisJl1 merely discredits 1 tself. We moderns 
knoW' that Asia has produc('d practically all of the 
great religions of the world, and some of the finest 
literature and art that the world has ever h.llown j 
while in America contributions have been trade to 
literature, science and art, which rival the produc-
Li on of the best minds that Europe has produced.. 
It will not do to dismiss the influence of the 
geographic factors by simply ridiculing Buckle. They 
do bear an important relation to the development of 
human society. No one can doubt the fact that where 
the cliMate has been favorable to the securing of an 
adequate food supply, and where the natural resources 
of a country have been plentiful, the people of that 
country have in nearly every instance ~reatly prospered. 
Let us take for example the settlement of our own 
count ry. l'he c lil'la tc was favorable, the soil was 
rich and fertile, the natural resources almost unlir.!-
85 
ited. When the white man landed on the 8hores or 
~orth America he found practically everything at his IJand, 
and a civilization was reared equal in tiJrle to the bes.t 
that the old world cculd afford. However, the illus-
tration can be applied in another direction. The 
1!eoJ!;raphic environment was favorable for tIle American 
Indian, then why did he not develop a civ1lization that 
was worthy to rank with the best that the old world 
could produce? 1t will not do to dismiss the 
question by asserting that the solution of the problem 
is to be accounted for by a dissi~ilarity in race. It 
may be so in part, but it is equally true that there was 
also a dissimilarity in psychic factors. In other 
words, the llsychical equipment of man also detcnr.ines 
what his civilization is to be, and may in some instances 
determine and control his p;eographic environment. How-
ever, when the geographical environT?1ent is favorable 
the general result is that human society will d.evelop 
alon~ cultural lines far more quickly and effectively 
t~an if the environ~ent is not ravorable. 
Scarcely second to the geor.;raphicttl environr.'lf'nt 
in importance is ttr economic environment. The 
cultural ori~lns of civilization can be easily traced 
to the evolution of indUstry and the capacity of Man 
for tool-~aking and tool-u~ing. The "instinct for 
workTnanship",as ]Jr. Veblen maintains, is as priMary 
(1 ) 
an instinct with man as are other instincts. In 
the nore f'avorahle env ironments tec}mology has made its 
most rapid advances. Where tlle environment has been 
f'avorable, e. tr,., the stellpt's of' central Asia and the 
river valleys of central Europe, a pastoral industry 
was evolved, and ~reat f'locks and herds were acctll!!ulated 
by the peoples en~aged therein. Along: with this 
development and accumulation of wealth in the s~upe of' 
f'locks and herds tllere was a relative increase in Jlopu-
lation, and of' necessity man was f'orced to till the 
ground. Thus an a~ricultural culture was evolved, or 
rather, in most instances, a series of' mixed f'arming. 
(2) 
This of' course prospered to a ~reater extent in the 
f'ertile river valleys where the environment was suitable. 
In these rich river valleys the population tended to 
increase at a more or less rapid rate, the rivers furnish-
ed channpls of transportation, and the evolution of 
indUstry was inevitably achievpd. Thus f'rom the ~eo~-
raph1cal and economic environment can be traced tlle 
technological development of industry, which has played 
so large a part in hu~an civilization. Still f'urther, 
many of' the institutions of the rac~ can be traced back 
to this geographical and economic environ~ent, which of' 
(1). The Instinct of WorJrnanship, Macnillan, 1910. 
(2). Veblen: Lectures on Economic Factors in Civilization. 
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course tended to color, to mold, and to shape the customs 
and traditions of the people. For instance, the ratri-
archal family was an inevitable outcome from the 
pastoral industry wherein warlike organizations must 
prevail for both defense and offense. With a mili-
tary organization the power tended to be in the hands 
of the men. This led to the view that woman was of 
less importance than man, so descent was traced through 
the male line, and in time the patriarchal family was 
evolved. The gOTernment, too, with its hereditary 
king, was developed from the patriarchal chief of the 
(1) 
pastoral group. From these few examples it can 
easily be seen that the economic and geor,raphical envir-
onrr.ent has unquestionably played a large part in the 
development of civilization, though not the whole part. 
While admittin~ that the enTironmental forces 
play a large part in the shaping and moldin~ of the 
customs, traditions and occupations of mankind, we 
would deny that they account for the entire development 
of civilization. Surely they do not account for all 
of the Tariations which we find existing between differ-
ent peoples ~ Furthermore we find some peoples devel-
oping a wonderful technology and culture under extremely 
unfavorable environmental conditions. An illustration 
(1). I am indebted to Dr. Veblen for this explanation of 
tl~ eTolution of the pastoral culture with its 
patriarcbal organization. 
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of this is seen in the wonderful agricultural development 
attained ny the Pueblo Indians in a semi-arid country, 
which far surpassed the agricultural achievements of 
other tribes living in a far more favorable habitat. 
Surely environment does not explain this. Environment 
surely does not explain the superiority of the Japanese 
to the Chinese, for the rich valleys of the Yank-Tse-Kiang 
and lIoang-Ho far surpass any part of Japan for fertility 
and productivity. A more deep-seated reason than 
enVironment Must be sought. 
lfhat is the influence of the environment upon the 
living organism? That is the problem with which we 
will now concern ourselves. This problem is so far-
reaching and so important in its genetic relations that 
we are involved with the origin of life itself. This 
problem has long been the concern of thinkers. The 
origin of living organisms upon this earth is as yet an 
unsolved problem. Science has long sought the solution, 
but as yet the endeavor has been in vain. Our science, 
however, is still young and perhaps sometime in the 
future some great sc1entific mind may ~ive us the solu-
tion. Pfluger and Verworn have suggested that the 
cyanogen radical (eN) was the starting point of the 
proteid molecule which is an essential constituent of 
the physical basis of life. This is theory only. 
Another theory is the chemical enzyme theory of the ori-
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gin of life. It presupposes that the world was in 
primitive atoms, and in this flux of molecular 
SUbstance a single catalyzer appeared. Two particles 
united throu~h the action of this catalyzer. Then 
two more combined, throwing off new catalyzers, and 
forming new enzymes. Thus around the core o~ this 
first product w1th the catalyzer at the center, the 
complex process of life had its simple beginning. 
The holders of this theory account for protoplasm by 
assumin~ a process called "catalysis", or "auto-
catalyzation". Surface tension be~ins, but when the 
forces of ~ravity become so great as to arrest this 
tension, there is a breaking up and splitt.in~ into two 
of a substance known as "primitive protoplasm". From 
this simple origin, the holders of the enzyme theory 
argue, was developed the nucleus for the more complex 
forms of life, the procedure being from the simple to 
the complex through the action of catalyzers forming 
(1) 
enzymes. 
This is, of course, a mechanistic theory of the 
ori~in of life, as is the one first stated. While 
1t ~ust be recognized that the synthetic chemist can do 
wonders in buildin~ up complex things from simple origins, 
artificial life has as yet never been produced. So 
~ar nothing in the chemical laboratory has been found 
(1). Professor Elliott: Lectures' on Genetic Psychology, 
given at Yale University. 
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that could take the place of the directive chemist of 
the Universe, since t~ere is so ~reat a ~ap existing 
between the making or organic matter and the makin~ of 
an organism. 
One of the nearest approaches to a partial mechanis-
tic mode of reproduction is that made by Professor, 
Jacques Loeb, who performed experiMP-nts which seemed to 
show that the spermatozoon may be dispensed with. That 
is, he was able to induce parthenogenetic developoont 
artificially in cases where it does not normally occur. 
He be~an with the hypothesis that the reason why the eggs 
of many marine animals do not develop parthenogenetically 
1s that something in the environment, i. e., the sea ... 
water, prevents it. He conducted his experiments by 
sUpplyin~ that which was lacking. To 
Loeb, "the mixture of about 50 per cent 
quote Professor 
of -j()t tJJ!t, d,~ 
(magnesium chloride) with about 50 per cent water was 
able to bring about the same effect as the entrance of 
a spermatozoon. The unfertilized e~gs of the sea-
urchin Arbacia were left :f.n such a solution for about 
two hours. When brou~ht back into normal sea-water 
they began to segment and form blastulae, ~astrulae, 
and plutei, which were normal in every respect. The 
only difference was that fewer eggs developed, and that 
their development was slower than in the case of the nor-
mal development of fertilized eggs. With each experiment 
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a series of control experiments was made to guard against 
the possible presence of spermatozoa in the sea-water. 
From these experiments it follows that the unfertilized 
egg of the sea-urchin contains all the essential ele-
m~nts for the production of a perfect pluteus ••••••••• 
All that the spermatozoon needs to carry into the egg 
for the process of fertilization are ions to supplement 
the lack of the one, or counteract the effects .of the 
other class of ions in the sea-water, or both. The 
spermatozoon may, however, carry in addition a number 
of enzymes or other material. The ions and not the 
nucleons in the spermatozoon are essential to the pro-
(1) 
cess of fertilization." This experi~entation, how-
ever, merely proves that the spermatozoon and ovum are 
completely equipped potential organisms, and that par-
tial parthenogenesis was already latent in the unfertil-
ized eggs. Artificial means have thus far failed to 
cause or induce partheno~enesis in the _ hi~_h~r organisms, 
and up to the present time the mechanistic attempt to 
explain the ori~in of life or to artificially reproduce 
life has failed. 
the mechanists have a tendency to interpret the 
behavior of the animate in terms of the inanimate. The 
(1). Jacques Loeb: "On the Artificial Production of Normal 
Larvae from the Unfertilized Eggs of the Sea-Urchin 
(Arbacia), Amer. Jour. Ph1siol. III, pp. 434-471. 
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organism, they regard, is a whole consisting or parts, 
each or which is conditioned in its behavior, and orten 
in , its existence by its relation to the remainder. 
These relations are such that as the parts interact with 
one another and with the outside world, they tend to under-
go a regular ser~es of changes which constitutes the 
development of the organism from birth to death. Since 
many or the processes or the living body can be explained 
upon mechanistic principles, that is, in particular the 
physical processes, they argue that a more perfect know-
ledge will enable us to express all organic processes in 
purely mechanistic terms. They offer in support of their 
contention that the circulatory system, for instance, in 
which the blood pUlsates from the heart, could be inferred 
from the action of a pump. The systems of distribution 
and transportation, also, in the liTing organism have 
their physical counterpart in the similar systems in the 
physical world. They are inclined to maintain that 
future knowledge will enable us to reduce purposiTe ac-
tion, artistic creation, philosophic thought, and the 
like to a complex of mechanical changes in the nervous 
(1) 
tissue. But the behavior of the animate cannot be 
expressed in terms of the inani~te. The behavior 'of man, 
as will be seen, cannot be expressed in terms or the 
(1). L. T. Hobhouse: Mind in Evolution, p. 83. 
./ 
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behavior of a machine. We almost always know what to 
expect rrom a stone, but among the living the unexpected 
orten happens. The changes which take_ place in inani-
mate nature such as the constant cutting of a riTer through 
its rocky bed, or the gradual action of the sea in its 
shaping of the contour of the shore, are mechanically 
determined by the environment in a passive sort of way, 
and not in any active, purposive sense. The response 
of- 1-nanirnate objects to external stiMuli can be exactly 
determined. In the exploding of a torpedo, a mechan-
ism releases the compressed air which is stored up in 
a chamber especially prepared, but the result can be 
exactly determined in advance. This sort of response 
is not found in the animate world, for the responses 
of living creatures are of a higher type. 
The behavior of the selenium dog, which had 
selenium cells for eycs, comes nearer to the behavior 
of living organismSe An ingenious inventor made an 
automatic dog with wheels so that _it could be moved in 
any direction throu~h the action of the light upon the 
selenium cells. A complex clock-work was fashioned 
inside the dog, which in response io the light would go 
in any direction from which the li~ht came. The behav-
ior, howevcr, was a direct reflex of the mechanism's 
response to some factor working external to it; there 
was nothing within the mechanism that made it respond • 
This may be regarded as an illustration of the more 
complex behavior of machines. The living organism 
difrers rrom a machine in its greater efficiency and the 
complexity of its behavior. As Dr. Thomson says, "it 
is a self-stoking, self-l'"epairing, selr-preservative, 
self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing en-
(1) 
gine." The machine is the tool, the production of 
human thought and human ingenuity. It may be that 
machines by elaboration and complexity may come to be 
more or less like organisms, but no machine profits by 
experience such as living organisms can and do. 
The mechanistic attempt to explain living organ-
isms in terms of the behavior or the inanimate or that 
of known machines is inadequate because unscientific. 
There are many chemical and physical operations in a 
living body, yet no complete physico-chemical descrip-
tion has yet been given of any distinctively vital 
activity. And if a physico-chemical description or 
such a simple vital process as the passage of the digest-
ed food rrom the alimentary canal into the blood, or the 
riltering of the blood by the kidney, cannot be given, 
then, how can mechanism ~ive an adequate physico-chemi-
cal explanation or growth, development, or behavior? 
Can ~echanism explain how the heritable characters of the 
(1). J. A. Thomson: Evolution, Ch. II, "The Organism 
and the Physical Environment". 
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race are potentially carried within the minute germ cells? 
Can mechanism explain variation? Until mechanism can 
answer such questions we are ~orced to regard its explan-
ations as inadequate. 
As Dr. Haldane has pointed out, "a living organ-
ism has, in truth, but little resemblance to an ordinary 
machine. The individual parts or the latter are st~ble, 
within very wide limits or immediate environment, and , in 
no way dependent on whether the machine is in action or 
at rest. This stability does not exist in the living 
organism ••••••• It seems clear, thererore, that we can-
not base our explanation or the constancy or the inter-
nal environment on the structure or the organis which 
regulate it, since closer examinations show that the 
'structure' or these organs is itselr dependent on the 
constancy or the internal environment. We are only 
reasoning in a circle when we attempt to explain the 
constancy o~ the internal environment by the speci~ic 
characterS t or bodily structure. The ~act is that both 
the external environment and the 'structure' or the body 
remain approximately constant; but or this ract no 
(1) 
explanation has been reached." Dr. Haldane ~urther 
holds that it is mainly through the nervous system that 
the body or especially the hi~her organisms, is in rela-
tion with the external environment. The nerTOUS system 
(1). John Scott Haldane: Organism and Environment, pp. 91-92. 
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must, thererore, act upon the stimuli which come rrom 
the environment; and this cannot be explained on purely 
mechanistic grounds. Thus we are rorced to regard the 
mechanistic conception as inadequate. 
Another theory which attempts to explain life is 
that which is known as Vitalism. It assumes that within 
the living body there is constantly at work a special 
influence, the so-called "vital principle", which guides 
the blind physical and chemical reactions which would 
otherwise play havoc with the organism. The best known 
living representatiTe of this theory is lians Driesch, 
an eminent experimental embryologist. Driesch holds 
that although matter and energy are what current physical 
and chemical conceptions describe them as being, yet in 
the liTing body they are guided by a vital force or spirit, 
(1) 
which he calls "entelechy". Driesch discovered that 
if the constituent cells or an embryo in its earlier 
stages or development are disarranged, or separated 
entirely from one another, a complete embryo may still de-
velop, even rrom a single cell. He argues from this 
and similar phenomena, that any mechanistic explanation 
or life is unthinkable; and, also, that the interference 
of a guiding inrluence, "entelechy", must be assumed, 
Which directs the assembly of material so that it develops 
(1). Hans Driesch: Die Organischen Regulationen. Vor-
berei tungen zu einer 'l'heories des Lebens, EngelMann, 
Leipsic, 1901. 
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in a proper way. Driesch thus clearly and errective-
ly criticizes the mechanistic theory, which he regards 
as untenable, as it is not only incompatible with the 
facts of heredity and embryology, but also with almost 
every fact in biology. 
The vitalistic theory, which Driesch proposes, is 
also to be reacted against. As Haldane says, "experience 
shows us that where an organism reacts in any way it is 
always in response to some stimulus, whether this stimu-
Ius originates from without or within. The stimulus of 
fertilization normally initiates the segmentation of an 
ovum, and from all analogy we must conclude that the 
differential stimUli arising from neighboring cells or 
other parts determine the subsequent differential behavior 
of each cell in the segmented OVlW. On separating the 
cells these differential stimuli are removed, and each 
eell naturally starts again from the be ginning. Vitalism 
is a theory of this kind: (run by an inside engineer, which 
is preposterous), it i~nores the participation of the 
environment in the regulation, and consequently does not 
correspond to the observed facts, and is thus of little (1) 
Use as a working hypothesis in actual investigation." 
The chief merit of the vitalistic theory is that it has 
elearly expressed facts relating to organic regulation, 
and has thus shown the defects of the mechanistic theory. 
Mechanistic theories have a tendency to lapse more or 
(1). Haldane, Ope cit., p. 111. 
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less into vitalism, for when the existence of definite 
and complex physical and chemical structures in the 
body are assumed, their development and maintenance 
~ust be accounted ror in terms or vitalism, even ir 
only in implication. 
Neither mechanists nor vitalists have actually 
~one to the root of the problem and inquired into the 
validity of the assumptions re~arding physical reality. 
This has been regarded from the standpoint of the 
entire organism, whereas the body is made up of cells, 
each or which is a centre or lire. The lire of the 
body as a whole is maintained by co-operation amongst 
the constituent cells. There are continual changes 
going on or metabolism, growth and reproduction. The 
constituent cells reproduce themselves and perish, and 
so does the whole organism itselr. Death, reproduction, 
and other biological phenomena, show us that life is not 
merely the lire of individual organisms, but the lire of 
a society or organisms. As Haldane says: "It is the 
life of a family, and beyond that the life of a species; 
or ir we endeavor to push the biological analysis still 
further, the life of the universe it~elf, though such a 
life must remain outside the limits of clear mental 
Vision until we can connect biological with physical and 
(1) 
chemical conceptions." This is the "Organicist" 
theory, or conception, which we shall adopt as being 
(1). Haldane, ibid, p. 114. 
/ 
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the most tenable position which in the light of scien-
tific knowledge can be occupied. 
This "organicist" theory h~s been best set forth 
by Dr. Halclane in his Yale Lectures upon the Silliman 
Foundation, on "Organism and Environment as Illustrated 
It (1) 
by the Physiology of Breathing. Dr. Haldane mRin-
tains that there is an inner as well as an outer environ-
ment to which the organism responds. While there is 
considerable response to the outer environment, the 
inner environment is not less important. Dr. Haldane 
regards breathing as a process in which the essential 
factors are the conveyance of oxygen into the body, and 
the removal from it of carbon. dioxide. This, however, 
contrary to the general idea, does not take place to much 
extent in the lungs, but in the living tissues of the 
body in general. Oxygen is taken up by the blood in 
the lungs and is thence carried into all parts of the 
body, the oxygen being given off by the blood to the 
tissues. The carbon dioxide which is formed, is car-
ried by the blood to the lungs where it is given off to 
the air which is breathed. This is the physiological 
statement of the act of breathing, but the phenomena 
cannot be explained by either mechanistic or vitalistic 
interpretations. 
Haldane says that breathing is dependent on the 
integrity of a very small area of the brain in the me-
(1). gf. Delage: L'Heredite, Paris, _ 1903, p. 435. 
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dulla oblongata, known as the respiratory centre. 
(1) 
If this respiratory centre is destroyed then all signs 
of' eo-ordinated. breathing efforts disappear. Further-
more, if the nervous connections between this centre 
and the respiratory muscles are severed, the latter 
become paralyzed. This constitutes the inner env1r-
onment upon which the physiology of' breathing largely 
depends. The respiratory centre may be considered to 
be a mechanism which reacts to slight changes in the 
concentration of water. The regulation, even if it be 
a mechanism, 1s utterly mysterious from the physical 
and chemical standpoint, and necessitates the assump-
tion of a special guiding foree, and this may be re-
garded, not as "entelechy", or as "elan vital", but 
rather as the brain controlling the respiratory centre 
itself. 
The process which we may designate as cell 
nutrition or cell respiration, is a sort of storage 
comparable to growth. The substance which forms this 
secretion comes from the outside environment. The 
living structure is alive and full of molecular activ-
ity. ·Substances are constantly being taken up from 
and ~iven off to the environment", says Haldane, "and 
even when t}-lese substances do not seem to be used up in 
adult nutrition, as for instance in the case of inorganic 
salts, there is a constant molecular interchange between 
the cell and its environment. This is proved by the 
rl). lIaldane, Ope cit., p. 5. 
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fact that, as was first shown in particular by Sidney 
Ringer, the tissues are extremely sensitive to the 
sli~htest changes in the concentrations of inorganic 
(1) 
salts in their environment." 
The living organism, therefore, bears but little 
resemblance to a machine. The component parts of the 
machine are stable so far as the immediate environment 
is concerned, and it makes no difference whether the 
machine is in action or at rest. This sort of sta-
bility does not, bowever, exist in the living organism; 
if" it reacts in a constant manner to a given cllange it 
is because the internal environment is constant or nor-
mal. This constancy of the internal environment does 
not depend upon the structure of the organs which 
regUlate, since close examination shows that tllis is, 
on the other hand, dependent on the constancy of the 
internal environment. This phenomena cannot be ex-
plained by the action of' the external environmE"nt which 
is less constant and tends to disturb the internal en-
vironmeht. It is mainly through the activities of the 
nervous system that the body is, in the higher organisms, 
in relation with the external environment. Response to 
heat, light, gravity, and other stimuli are registered 
through the nervous system. The regulation of the 
external environment is thus only the outward extension 
(1). Haldane, ibid, pp. 66-67. 
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or the regulation or the internal environment. The 
environment determines the nervous reactions, and the 
nervous reactions determine the envirolUTient; 'hut the 
constancy of reguldtion must be explained by the activ-
ity and selr-assertiveness or the organism itself. To 
reach any other conclusion would lOean merely to relapse 
into vitalism. An "entelechy" or directing energy 
need not be supposed. Th{' complexity of the nervous 
system which centers in the brain can account for this 
regulation of the environment, both external and internal. 
The behavior of organisms largely difrers. What 
we have been describing is the function of the structures 
which determine the behavior or the higher organisms, 
such as man. In the unicellular organiH~s, however, 
the behavior is nearly altogether determined by the 
environment. The response of unicellular organisms to 
stimuli can be almost exactly determined in advance. 
The behavior may be regarded as tropistic, ~s Jennings 
and others have pointed out. They respond toward the 
light, toward heat, toward pressure, aln indeed are almost 
entirely controlled by the environment. An illustra-
tion of this ma.y be seen in.the contractility or the 
amoeba when irritated by either light or pressure. 
The behavior of more complex multicellular organ-
isms, which are be 1m, man, is largely determined by the 
environment, but only partly so. Their behavior, too, 
5-1 
is tropistic. They respond much as the action of the 
environment dictates. The environment, however, cannot 
control the instincts which these higher organisms have. 
An illustration of this is seen in "the eel migration" 
(1) 
which Mr. E. S. Russell describes. The eel has a 
brain of a low order, and is not at all to be regarded 
as having a mental life, such as may be present in the 
more intelligent birds ami mammals. The eels of northern 
Europe begin their life in the ocean to the west of Ire-
land. The youn~ eel is spawned and rises to the upper 
warmer waters as a transparent, flat, lrnife-blade-like 
larva about three inches in length and colorless except 
its eyes. It gradually becomes transformed into a 
glass eel, shorter in length, and like a knitting needle 
in girth. After a few months it passes up the inland 
streams and into the ponds where- it matures and fattens. 
It does not breed, however, in fresh water. After some 
years they become restless and start a migration into the 
waters of the deep sea, bec~ming silver-like in color as 
they go. They migrate hundreds of miles back to their 
original habitat, i.e., the deep sea to the west of Irelam. 
This cannot be explained as bein~ due to the action of 
the environ~ent; it must be due to a deep-soated instinct 
inherent in the eel which causes this complex behavior. 
It is instinct that causes the originally deep salt-water 
eel, which has colonized fresh water, to return to salt-
(1). E. S. Russell: "Vitalism", Rivista di Scienza, April, 
1911. 
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water again to spawn. The salmon, a fresh water organ-
ism, has taken to salt water, but each year it returns 
to fresh water, going up high falls and cascades, 
returning to its birth place to spawn. No matter how 
many falls it must jump ov~r, or how rigorous the hard-
shins may be - the salmon returns to inland streams to 
spawn and die. Both of these are phenomena which 
mechanism with its physico-chemical parallelism cannot 
explain. 
The behavior of organisms proceeds in a series of 
steps, simple or complex, just as the organism is simple 
. 
or complex. IlL Among the infuslorae the behavior is very 
simple. No matter what the stimuli may be the response 
is the same, and expresses itself through irritability 
and conductivity. The behavior of the,protozoa is a 
little higher, and seems to present the rudiments of a 
trial and error method. But in the behavior of the 
higher manunals, intelligence seems to flay some little 
1) 
part, as Thorndike has clearly shown. He found, 
however, that the behavior was predictable, that the same 
situation "ill, in the same animal produce the same 
response. Thorndike _regards that "every response or 
change in response of an animal is then the result of 
the interaction of its original knowable nature and the 
environment." (2) But Thorndike regards the hi.e;her 
(1). E. L. Thorndike: Animal Intelligence, N. Y., 1911. (2). Ibid, p. 242. 
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animals as capable or learning new ways or doing things, 
although their capacity for learning is more or less low. 
When we come to man we have more complex behavior. 
There seems t~ be actual correlation between the static 
and the dynamic aspects of behavior, and between struc-
tUre and function. The growth in the number, speed of 
formation, permanence, delicacy and complexity of associ-
at ions reaches its fullest. development in man. Thorn-
dike says: "The neurones which compose the brain and 
the connections between which are the physiological par-
allels of the habits that animals form, show, as we pass 
down through the vertebrate series, an evolution along 
lines of increased delicacy and complexity. That an 
animal associates a certain act with a certain felt situa-
tion means that he forms or strengthens connections be-
tween certain cells. The increase in number, delicacy 
and complexity of cell structures is thus the basis for 
an increase in the number, delicacy and complexity of 
(1) 
associations." Thus the increased delicacy and com-
plexity of the cell structures in the human brain, which 
~ive the possibility of brain processes and connections, 
makes conceptual thinking possible. This it is that 
makes human behavior of a higher type than that of ani-
mala. The intellectual evolution of the rae., there-
fore, consists in an increase in the number, delicacy, 
complexity, permanence and speed of the formation of asso-
Ciations; and this ~questionably modifies the behavior 
(1). Ibid, p. 287. 
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of man so that it becomes poss1l1le for him to largely 
control both his internal and external environMent. We 
have thus a series of acquired activity complexes, 
which surely cannot be explained in mechanistic terms, 
or to be accounted for by the activity of the physical 
environment. 
The conclusion which we have thus re.lched is that 
the environment, while it has a very great and con-
siderable influence on the organism, does not control 
the behavior of the higher organisms, in particular, 
man. The delicacy and complexity of the nervous struc-
tures, which center in the brain are such that the res-
ponse of man to the st:lmuli frot'l the environment cannot 
be predictable. Mind is thus a factor in the evolution 
of the race, and is also a factor in the determination 
of the behavior of mankind. The living' organisM (man) 
is not passive, but active, not mechanical in its 
reactions to the environment, but self-assertive, 
plastic and largely self-dotermining. The environ-
~ent, economic and geographical, plays a ~reat part in 
the life cycle of the individual, but not the whole 
part, as we have seen. The "organicist" theory 
which Dr. Haldane has proposed has demonstrated this. 
'Ihis theory does not. insist that the organi,sm al together 
controls its env:lronment, but that it does in some 
measure determine what its environment is to be; and in 
5R 
that sens~ is independent of its ~nTironMent. The 
environmental factors, althoup.:h extremely important 
by reason of furnishing the raw material with which the 
organism must work, are in themselves insufficient to 
furnish an adequate theory of the social forces. 
59 
CHAPTER III 
HERRDITY A~n VARIATIUN 
(TOE BIOLOGICAL FACTORS) 
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CHaPTER III 
HEREDITY AND VAnIATION 
The importance or the biological factors in socio-
logy must not be minimized, for they are one or the un-
changing, almost immutable, facts or organic lire. The 
indiyidual life is in large measure determined by what 
it has to begin with, because of its hereditary relation 
to parents and ancestors. Thus we cannot arrord to dis-
regard the racts or heredity in our explanation of the 
past, our behavior in the present, and the prediction or 
our probable behavior in the ruture. Great importance 
to be sure must be given to environmental factors such 
as soil, climate, rood, geographical position, technol-
ogy, etc; and to the psychical ractors in their broadest 
sense; but all or these merely act upon an organism 
whose rundamental nature is determined, although not 
exactly rigidly rixed by its heredity. AS Herbert 
Spencer has said, inherited constitution must ever be 
the chier ractor in determining character. 
Heredity may be re~arded as a condition of all 
organic evolution. The variations which go to make up 
progress or retrogression have direct racial importance 
because they are transmissible; although acquired char-
~cters, on the other hand, are never transmissible. 
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Thus in the study of heredity we are concerned with the 
(1) 
origin of life itself. As J. Arthur Thomson has well 
said: "Every living creature arises from a parent or 
from parents more or less like itself; this reproductive 
(1). Many definitions of heredity have been gi~en. "The 
word heritage", says Francis Galton, "has a more 
limited meaning than nature or the sum of inborn 
qualities. Heritage is confined to that which is 
inherited, l!fhile nature also includes those indivi-
dual variations that are due to other causes than 
heredity and which act before birth". (Galton: 
NatUral Inheritance, p. 293). A more precise, 
thou~h less exact statement is made by Professor 
Karl .Pearson, "ho says that "heredity is the la" 
which accounts for the change of type between 
parent am offspring, i. e., the pro,l!:resHion from 
·the racial towards the parental type-. (Pearson: 
The Grammar of Science, p. 474). A longer and 
perhaps better definition is that given by Lankester, 
which is as follows: "Living matter has the special 
property of adding to its bull{ by taking up the . 
. chemical elements which it requires and buildin~ up 
the food so taken as additional living matter. It 
further has the power of separating from itself 
minute particles or ~er~s which feed and grow inde-
,endently and thus multiply their kind. It is a 
fundamental character of this process of reproduc-
tion that the detached or pullated germ inherits or 
carries with it from its parents the peculiarities 
of form and structure of its parent. This is the 
property known as heredity. It is most essentially 
modified by another property - namely, that though 
eventually growing to·be closely like the parent, 
the germ (espeCially when it is formed, as is usual, 
by the fusion of two germs from two separate parents) 
is never identical in all respects with the parent. 
It shows Variation. In virtue of Heredity the new 
congenital variations shown by a new generation are 
transmissible and are transmitted to their offspring 
" when in due time they pullulate or produce germs • 
(E. Ray Lankester: Kingdom of Man, p. 10.) Lockt 
considers heredity as "the transference of similar 
character9 from one generation of organisms to 
another, a process effected by means of the germ-
cells or gametes". Lock gives a"fuller definition 
in the same work where he says, by inheritance we 
mean those methods and processes by which the con-
stitution and characteristics of an animal or plant 
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or ~enetic relation has a visible material basis in the 
~erminal matter (ust~lly e~g-c~ll and sp~rm-cell) liber-
, 
ated from the parental body or bodies; by inheritance we 
mean all the qual it fes or ch..a.racters whicl1 have their in-
itial seat, th~ir physical basis in the fertilized egg-
cell; the expression of' this inheritance in develop~nt 
results in the organism. Thus heredity is no entity, 
no force, no principle, but a convenient term for the 
~enetlc relation between successive generations, and 
inheritance includes all that the organism is or has to 
(1) 
start with in virtue of its hereditary relation." 
Thus it becomes the business of heredity to inTes-
tigate the preci,se nature of this genetic relation in the 
diverse forms of reproduction and to determine the rel-
ation in which a liberated ~erm-cell or gaMete stands to 
the body which liberates it, or the relation in which a 
fertilizedoTuM stands to the germ-cells of the body in 
which it develops. . It also seeks to determine what con-
(1). 
are handed on to its offspring, this transmission of' 
characters being, of course, associated with the fact 
that the offspring is developed by the processes 
of growth out of a small 'rag~ent detached from'the 
parent organism." (Lock: Recent Progress in the 
Study of Variation, Heredity and Evolution, p. 292 
and p. 1). A pithi~r defintion is that given by 
Professor Castle, who says: "ny heredity,. then, we 
mean organic reseMblance based on descent • (Castle: 
Heredity, p. 6). All of these definitions carry 
within themselves the same nrinciple - namely, that 
heredity is the transmissio~ of the physical qualities 
of one generation to the one arising f'rom it; and 
variation is the unlikeness arising between parent 
and offspring. 
Thomson: Heredity, p. 6. 
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tribution has been made by parents and ancestors to the 
new organism. Logically, Jlered,i ty is concerned with 
all a~encics which in any way affect, condition, or limit 
the coming into being of a new or~anism or a new race. 
This evolutionary aspect of heredity has forced man to 
entertain thoughts of the future of his own race, and to 
take measures to control that future, a matter formerly 
left largely to chance. As man understands more fully 
and perfectly the facts and worldngs of heredity he will 
be the better enabled to insure and secure his own future. 
The existenoe ot oivilized man must ultimately de~nd u~on 
his ab1lity to produce from the earth in sufficient abun-
dance cultivated ~lants and domesticated animals. This 
is :furthered by a care:ful study and logical 'lforkin~ out 
of the principles involved in heredity. Thus we see 
that civ:f.lization had its beginning in the attainment of 
such knowledge and is limited by it at the present time. 
It need not, however, lead to a "stock breederts" ·theory 
of heredity or of sociology; it only means the :full recog-
nition of the importance of" the principles of" heredity and 
Variation in their ef"fect upon civilized human life. 
If heredity is the transmission of the physioal 
qUalities or the race, what is the basis of that trans-
mission? Haeckel said more than fifty years ago 
that "we may regard the nucleus of" the cell as the prin-
(1) 
c1pal organ of inheritance", a propbecy which has proved 
-
(1). Haeckel: General Morphology, p. 288. 
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true. Another writer thirty-~our years later wrote: 
"The cell is not only the seat or vital activity, but 
is also the vehicle or hereditary transmission; and the 
life of successive generations or living beings shows 
no breach of continuity, but rorms a continuous vital 
stream in which, as Virchow said, rules an 'eternal law 
(1) 
of continuity." The gerM-cell is the vehicle or 
hereditary transmission. The Individual life or the 
majority or plants and animals begins in the union of 
the sperm-cell and the ee;~-cell. These microscopic in-
dividualities unite to form a new individuality, which 
develops into a creature like to, and yet difrerent from 
its parents. The physical basis of inheritance, there-
rore, is in the rertilized ovum. Althou~h a rew excep-
tions may be found the vast majority or living or~anisms 
(2) 
begin lire in a fertilized egg-cell. 
(1). E. B. Wilson: The Cell in Development and Inheritance, 
p. 76. 
(2). The followin~ scheme rrom Thomson (Heredity, p. 29) 
shows how each new life begins as a fertilized eg~­
cell, and illustrates the diverse modes or reproduc-
tion in unicellular and multicellular organisms: 
I. In unicellular organisms. 
1. Dy division into two. 
2. By budding, a modified form of division. 
~. By sporulation or division into many units. 
The reproduction may be wholly asexual: 
1. In the sense that there is nothing corres-
pondin~ to fertilization or amphimixis. 
2. In the sense that there are no special germ-
cells. But in many unicellular organisms 
there are elaborate processes of am.phimixis. 2. In multicullular organ sms: 
1. Without special germ-cells, e.g., by division 
of the body, by giving off buds (and as the 
tio 
We are not, however, concerned here with repro-
duction in unicellular organisms. Instead we are direct-
ly concerned with reproduction in multicellular organisms 
in which fertilization takes place by direct contact of 
the male spermary with the female ovum and the fertilized 
egg-cell gives rise to an embryo. In all the higher 
animals and plants a new individual arises, by what we 
may call a sexual process, from the union of two minute 
bodies called the reproductive cells. They are an eg~-
eell or ovum, furnished by the mother; and a sperm-cell, 
Or spermary! furnished by the father. There is a great 
difference in size between egg and sperm. 
, -
The egg is 
many thousand times greater in bulk, a large part of 
which serves as food for the new or~ani8m, furnishing it 
with building material until such a time as it can begin 
to secure food for itself. 
In the primitive male sex cells, which are twelve, 
there are six groups, each containin~ four chromosomes. 
Then a spindle is formed, after which the cell divides and 
the nucleus of each cell contains twelve chromosomes. 
result of artifical cuttin~) 
2. With special germ cells. 
1. E~~9 from one ~rent are fertilized by sp~rms 
from another parent - hetero~amy, the com-
monest mode. 
-2. E~~s from one parent are fertilized by sperms 
from the same (hermaphrodite) parent - auto-
gamy, a very rare mode. 
~. Eggs may develop without rertilization -
parthenogenesis. 
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Then the process of division is repeated in each. 
A reducing cell division follows so that each of the 
four new cells contains six chromosomes. these are 
the immature sperms. The protoplasm of each, in a 
majority of cases, undergoes a great elongation so 
that the sperm has a long tail. Maturation is now 
complete. Thus the sperm or male gamete is a true 
cell, especially modified in most cases for active 
movement, and is now known as a gamete. 
The ova arise from primitive sex cells resem-
bling those which give rise to the sperms. They 
divide and give rise to the female egg-cells, which 
do not immediately undergo division but remain passive 
and inc~ease in size by the absorption of nutriment 
from the surrounding parts, and in this way each 
female egg-cell gives rise to an ovum. Before the 
ovum is ripe for conjugation with a sperm, or able to 
undergo the first stage of segmentation, it has to go 
through a process known as maturation, which consists 
essentially of a twice repeated process of cell division, 
and resembles the process described in the case of the 
sperms. Thus a female gamete is formed. A zygote 
results from the union of two gametes in fertilization, 
an egg with a sperm, and fertilization is complete. The 
result is a new organism, at first a single cell, but 
later an embryo comprised of many cells, and at birth a 
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new individual of the race to which its parents belong. 
Various theories of heredity have been proposed, 
all of which center around the evolution theory, which 
is an attempt to explain the present condition of the 
world in terms of simpler pre-existing conditions. 
One of the earliest attempts to develop a systematic 
(1) 
theory of evolution was that made by Lamarck. 
Lamarck's theory was a linear theory of evolution an::l 
was closely bound up with the theory of the inheritance 
of acquired traits. Lamarck supposed that the 
effects of the environment are cumUlative from gener-
ation to generation SO that long continued growing in 
rich soil would produce a ·more luxuriant race, while 
continued growing in poor soil would produce a different 
and smaller race. Lamarck also regarded that new 
physical needs would cause new variation; i. e., if an 
animal needed a horn to fight with or teeth to chew with, 
that this need would cause the production of horns and 
teeth respectively. He fUrther re~arded use and dis-
use as a factor in variation. The use of an organ, 
such as the arm or leg, causes it to increase in size 
and strength; while conversely disuse causes decrease 
in size and efficiency. Lamarck believed that variations 
Of every sort are inherited. Those which resulted from 
the direct action of the env1ronment, or from use and 
disuse, he regarded as acquired traits, and considered 
\1). See Thomson: HeredIty, upon Lamarckrs theory. 
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them inheritable. 
Darwin's view of evolution was from the stand-
pOint of natural selection. He held thdt plants and 
animals tend to multiply more rapidly than it is 
possible for them to exist; and that more offsprin~ 
are produced by even the slowest breeding aniJ~ls and 
plants than can possibly find sustenance. This 
result of overproduction causes the individuals that 
are born to engage in a constant struggle for the 
opportunity to survive. This becomes a struggle for 
existence in which the fittest only will survive. In 
regard to variation Darwin believed that all plants 
and animals show a large amount of diversity among 
themselves, and, as a result, some are better fitted 
or equipped for the struggle for existence than others. 
By the laws of heredity individuals transmit their own 
characteristics to their offspring. When an individ-
Ual survives in the stru~gle for existence by virtue 
of some special characteristic, it will transmit this 
characteristic to its offspring, which will inherit it, 
and in the course of a few generations the only individ-
Uals left alive will be those that have it, while the 
rest will be exterminated through the operation of the 
(1) 
law of natural selection. 
(1). Charles Darwin: Domestication of Plants and 
animals, London, lR68. 
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Herbert Spencer was the champion ot eTolution 
from the standpoint of philosophy. He tried to ex-
plain the .structure of liTing substance, (protoplasm), 
in harmony with the chemical explanation ot lifeless 
Substance then current. He regarded that these 
structural units of protoplasm were comparable with the 
molecules of chemical compounds, each kind of proto-
plasm within the body being composed of a different 
ktnd, or kinds, of units, which he called "physiolog-
ical units". He ~egarded that they carry within them-
selYes the traits of the species, of the ancestors, 
of the parents, . and eTen of the individual organism 
itself. The fundamental traits which are concerned 
with the structure of the species must be unchange-
able, while superficial traits can be moditied without 
much difficulty. These modified traits which express 
Yariations in the parents and immediate ancestors, though 
Unstable, must be con~1dered as capable ot becomin~ 
s table in time. Further, Spencer supposed "an un-
ceasin~ circulation of protoplasm throughout an organ-' 
1sm", wh1ch in time is eventually gathered into sperm-
cells and egg-cells, and which also bear these traits. 
He regarded sperm-cells and egg-cells are essentially 
noth1n~ more than Tehicles in which are contained small 
groups ot physiological units which determine the like-
(1) 
~ess of ottsprin~ to their parents. Thus Spencer's 
-(1). Herbert Spencer: Biology. 
/ d . ;;" { ; l , Ivn tf.. 
(' J I)rw. . 
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theory of heredity becomes a neo-Lamarckian contention 
for the inheritance of acquired traits. 
Another theory along the lines or natural 
selection is that or Weismann, who held to "the con-
tinuityor the germ plasm". A comprehensive state-
ment or this ~iew is round in Weismann's own work. 
(1) "In each development a portion or the specific 
germinal plasma (Keimplasma), which the parental 
ovum contains, is not used up in the formation of the 
offspring, but is reserved unchan~ed ror the formation 
of the germinal cells of the following generation. 
(2) What is. actually continuous is the germ-plasm -
of definite chemical and special molecular constitu-
tion. A continuity of germinal cells is now rare; 
a continuity of intact germinal plasma is constant. 
(3) Thts germ-plasm has its seat in the nucleus, is 
extremely complex in structure, but has nevertheless 
an extreme power of persistence and enormous powers 
of growth. (4) The germ-substance proper must· be 
looked for in the chromatin of the nucleus of the 
~erm-cell, and more precisely still in those ids or 
chromosomes which we conceive of as containing the 
primary constituents of a complete organism. Such 
ids in larger or smaller numbers make up the whole 
germ-plasm of a germ-cell, and each id in its turn 
consists of primary constituents or determinants, i. 
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e., of yital units, each of which determines the ori-
~in and development of a particular part of the organ-
ism. (5) The splitting up of the substance of the 
OTum into a somatic part, which directs the deTelopment 
of the indiYidual, and a prorogative part, which reaches 
the germ-cells and there remains inactiYe, and later 
giTes rise to the succeeding generation, constitutes 
the theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm, which 
I first stated in a work which appeared in the year 
. (1) 
1885." Weismann called the cells which collectiye-
ly make up the body the ~; while those undifferentiated 
cells destined for reproduction he called germ-cells, 
or collectiTely the germ-plasm. He maintained that 
the germ-cells, since they are not descended from the 
body-cells, but only from the fertilized egg-cell, have 
no way of transmitting body-modifications, i. e., 
acquired characteristics. 
Francis Galton was the founder of biometry, which 
is an attempt to statistically measure Tariation. But 
the main contribution made by Galton was his law of 
ancestral inheritance which was as follows: "The two 
Parents contribute between them on the aTerage one-half 
or (0.5) of the total heritage of the offspring; the 
2 
four grandparents, one-quarter, or (0.5) ; the eight 
(1). Weismann: The ETolution Theory, Trans. by J. 
Arthur Thomson and M. R. Thomson, London, 1904, 
Vol. I, p. 411. 
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3 great-grandparents, one eighth, or (0.5) , and so on. 
Thus the sum of the ancestral contributions is ex-
2 3 pressed by the series (0.5) + (0.5) + (0.5) , etc., 
which being equal to 1 accounts for the whole heri-(1) -
tage." This theory of heredity as proposed by 
Galton is not accepted today as authoritative, and 
is far from reconcilable with Mendelian heredity, 
which is held for the mos t part by leadin.~ biologists. 
Darwin had collected much data regarding varia-
tiona in plants and animals, and after his death 
this work was carried on by Bateson. Dateson 
stated in 1A89 that variations fall naturally into 
two classes, continuous and discontinuous. Contin-
UOUs variations, he regarded as those which are 
graded, the extremes being connected by a complete 
series of intermediate conditions; while in discon-
tinuous variations there are wide gaps in which no 
intermediate stages are present. Discontinuous varia-
tion, he regarded, as more important in species forma-
tion because it helped to simplify natural selection. 
In discontinuous variations the less fit perished 
through the operation of the law of the survival of the 
fittest. Thus Bateson practically held to the mutation 
(2) 
theory. 
(1). Francis Galton: The Average Contribution of Each 
Several Ancestor to the Total Heritage of the 
Offspring, 1897, p. 402. 
(2). W. Bateson: Materials for the Study or Variation, 1894. 
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~ E!rcat-~rand.parf!nts, one eit!hth, or (0.5) , am so on. 
Thus the sUM or the ancestral ·eontrlbutions 1s express-
( .) ( . ) 2 ( ):1 . . cd by' the series 6.5 ... 0-;5 . .., 0.5 ~ etc., which, 
being-e~ual to 1, account fo 
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The mutation theory of heredity that new races 
and species originate discontinuously and not grad-
ually, received its strongest support from the work 
of the Dutch botanist, Hugo De Vries, who applied ex-
perimental methods. He began his work by studying the 
variations of species of plants in the field, t~ans­
ferrtng the variations to his garden and there subject-
ing them to selection. What Bateson regarded as dis-
continuous variations, De Vries spealcs of as "fluctuating". 
In the preface to his work published in 1905, De Vries 
says: "The current belief assumes that species are slow-
ly changed into new types. In contradiction to this 
conception the theory of mutation assumes that new spec-
ies and varieties are produced from existing forms by 
SUdden leaps. The parent-type itself remains unchang-
ed throughout the process, and may repeatedly give 
birth to new forms. These may arise simultaneously 
and in groups, or separately at more or less widely 
distant periods ••••• My work claims to be in full accord 
-ith the principles laid down by Darwin, and to gi~e a 
thorough and sharp analysis of some of the ideas of varia-
tion, inheritance, selection, and mutation, which were 
(1) 
necessarily vague at his time." De Vries in his 
eX~riments with the e~enin~ primrose developed more than 
a do~en new types. Some of these mutants were feeble, 
"(1). Hugo De Vries: Species and Varieties, their Origin 
by Mutation, 1905. (Preface). 
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and their variability fluctuated. They varied from the 
parent type in size, vigor, productivity, pigment and 
fi tness to survive. On the whole the success or non-
~uccess of the mutant depended upon its fitness to 
survive in the struggle for existence. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution to the theory 
of heredity was that made by Gregor Johann Memel, who 
in 1866, after many years of patient experimentation 
reached a very important conclusion in regard to the 
inbreeding of hybrids, which is known as "Mendel's Law". 
Mendel used the edible pea, (Pisum sativum) in his 
experiments. Be found seven differentiating charac-
ters which could be r 'elied on: (1) The form of the 
ripe seeds, whether roundish, with shallow wrinkles or 
none, or angular and deeply wrinkled. (2) The color 
of tbe reserve material in the cotyledons - pale yellow, 
bright yellow, orange, or green. (3) The color of the 
seed-coats, whether white, as in most peas with white 
flowers, or grey, grey-brown, leather brown, with or 
without violet spots, and so on. (4) Tbe form of the 
ripe pods, whether simply inflated, or constricted or 
wrinkled. (5) The color of the unripe pods, whether 
light or dark green, or vividly yellow, this color 
being correlated with that of stalk, leaf-veins, and 
blossoms. (6) The position of the flowers, whether 
aXial or terminal. (7) the length of the stem, whether 
(1) 
taIlor dwarfish. 
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Mendel proceeded to make crosses between these 
hybrids, and found that each showed one of each pair of 
contrasted characters to the total, or almost total, 
exclusion of the other. He called the character which 
prevailed the dominant, and the character that was sup-
pressed, the recessive. The result was that in crosses 
between the plant with the dominant character with one 
possessing the recessive character the offspring resem-
bled the dominant parent in regard to that characteris-
tic. He further obtained the law of the splitting of 
hybrids, or segregation, by allowing these cross-bred 
Plants to fertilize themselves, with the result that 
their offspring exhibited the two original forms, on the 
average of three dominants to one recessive. The 
recessive character, fertilizing themselves, bred true. 
The dominants, however, when allowed to fertilize them-
selves, produced one-third of pure dominants, and two-
thirds of cross-bred dominants, which upon a second 
self-fertilization gave rise to a mixture of dominants 
and recessives 1n the proportion of ~ : 1. This theory 
Of heredity is the one accepted by practically all lead-
Ing biologists at the present time. A very clear sum-
~ary of it is given by R. C. Punnett, who states the 
resu1 t thus: "lfhe"never there occurs a pair of differ-
-
(1). This summary of Mendel's work is taken from Thomson: 
Heredity, p. 338. Mendelts original work is en-
tttled, Experiments in Plant Hybridization, Tr. by 
Bateson, 1901. 
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entiating characters, of which one is dominant to the 
other, three possibilities exist: th~re are recessives 
which always breed true to the recessive character; there 
are dominants which breed true to Ule dominant char-
actel'; and are thererore pure; and thirdly, ttt('re are 
dominants which ~y be called :impure, am which on selr-
fertilization (or in inbreeding where the sexes are 
separate) give both dominant and recessive rorms in the 
fixed proportion of three or the rormer to one or the 
(1) 
latter." 
The theory or heredity that will be advanCed in 
this thesis is a combination or the Mendelian view 
and Weismann's theory of the continuity or the germ 
plasm. that is to say,' changes in the new organis~s 
can take place only through ctlanges in the germ plas~ of 
the parent; and any variation in the species must follow 
the ~endelian lines of dominance and recession. Althou~h 
new speCies may arise throur;h Mutation, these mutations 
are largely controlled by Mendelian law, and ",ust be 
regarded as b~ing tJle result of a cbange or changes in 
the germ-plasm of the adult organisM. 
We will now consider some or the problems of 
heredity. The problem of reversions or atavisms is 
one that long puzzled biologists. To it Darwin repeat-
(1). R. C. Punnett: Mendelism, Cambridge, 1907, p. 63. 
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edly called attention. Be reg'd.rded, however, that this 
was partly due to environmental influences, and part-
ly due to the effect of cross breeding which may at 
times reawaken slumbering ancestral traits. He noticed 
that when rabhits of various species are turned loose 
in a warren together, they tend to revert to the gray-
ccated appearance of wild rabbits. These reversions 
are now explained by Mendelian principles, namely, that 
a trait of an ancestor is apt to show itself in the 
present or a later generation. ArOlmd the term "rever-
8ion" many false and erroneous ideas have gathered them-
selves, as ~ateson pointed out. He remarked that "it 
~ould probably help the s~ience of biology if the word 
'reversion' and the ideas it denotes were wholly drop-
ped, at all events until variation has been studied 
(1) 
~uch more fully t~~n it has yet been." Practically 
all reversions, however, can be accounted for by apply-
ing the Mendelian principles of variation •. For instance, 
if" a black child is born to white parents, careful inves-
tigation will st.ow that there was negro blood in the 
f"arnily at some previous ti~e, in so~e ancestor. "Ata-
Vism" is slightly different from "reversion", because 
it is the falling back to a prototype, from which the 
ancestors have been evolved • This would be quite possi-
. ble, according to the laws of dominance and recession, 
-(1). W. Bateson: Materials f"or the study of Variation, 
London, 1894, p. 78. 
.\ 
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but cases of atavism are exceedingly rare. ReTersion, 
on the other hand, is simply variation, following the 
Mendelian dominant and recessive characters. Both 
reversion and atavism mUst be re~arded as being largely 
due to cross-breeding, or hybridization. 
' The problem of "telegony" is of little moment 
as it has been discarded and discredited by practi-
cally all scientists. It was supposed to be the inf-
lUence of a preTious sire on offspring subsequently borne 
by the same female to a different sire. The classic 
Case is tJjat of Lord Morton's mare, an Arabian, which 
bore a colt to a qua~~a. She was afterwards bred 
to a black Arabian horse, and produced two colts, which 
(1) 
Showed some of the characteristics of the quagga. 
These supposed reTersions, howeTer, can be accounted 
for by Tariation, or by the rcaprearance of latent 
ancestral ctaract~rs. The old belief in telegony is 
absolutely unfounded, and supposed cases are either 
striking coincidences or else Tariations to be account-
ed for by Mendelian principles. 
The probleM of the inheritance of acquired traits 
is of more importance because it is still Jleld by Borne 
SCientific men. The theory of the inheritance of ) (2 
acqUired traits, as we have already pointed out, was 
best stated by Lamarck, who systernatized it. He 
--~----------------------------------------f~).· Thomson: Heredity, p. 114-146. ) See p. 67. 
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thought that variation was due either to the direct 
action of the environment, or to use or non-use. this, 
if true, 1!'ould reduce heredity largely to the action 
of the environmental forces which play upon the individ-
ual organism. We have neo-T.arnarck:lans st ill wi th us, 
so that this theory must be refuted. Those who hold 
to the inheritance of acquired traits contend that 
there can be structural changes in the body, induced by 
some change in use or disuse, or by a change in the 
environment, which affects the germ-ceJls in such a 
specific way that the offspring will through inheri-
tanceexhibit in more or less degree the modification 
which the parent has acquired. The inheritance of 
vestigial organs which are no longer used is one of th~ 
proofs which the Lamarckians offer. ETery one of us 
is a walldng museum of such relics, such as the unused 
muscles of the ear, the rudiJ!l~ntary third eyelid, the 
vermiform appendix, gill clefts of mammals, etc. This, 
however, does not proTe that the unused organs were not 
inherited. Simllarily, it is claimed that sunburn, 
·the tannin~ of the skin, etc., are inheritable. These 
things are not proved through thorough, careful inTes-
tigation. It is not to be d~nied that the child inher-
its the acquired traits of his ancestors, and much of 
their culture or civilization; but he does not receive 
this throu~h physical heredity. On the otJ~r hand, 
80 
this is social heredity, which Baldwin says is "analo~ous 
. (1) 
to physical heredity." He says that "it is hereditary 
in the sense that the child cannot escape it. It is 
as inexorably his as the color of his eyes and the shape 
of his nose. He is born into a system of social rela-
t:fonsh1ps Just as he is born into a certain quality ot 
air. As he grows in body by breathing the one, so he 
(2) 
grows in mind by absorbin~ the other." This is the 
social inheritance of acquired traits, but it does not 
have a physical basis at all. Baldwin summarizes the 
dif'f'erences between phystcal and social heredity thus: 
"Plasticity, tJieref'ore, on the one hand, and fixity, 
on the otber hand, sum up the differences between social 
and physical h~redity on the side of the or~an1sm; while 
high consciousness, seen in attention, voluntary imita-
tion, concentration, on the one hand, and low, dreamy, 
dif'fused SUbconscious proc.esses, on the other hand, serve 
to define the distinction on the stde of the mental life 
(3) 
itself." 
Weismann, perhaps more than any other, has dis-
eredit~d the Lamarckian contention for the inheritance 
Of acquired traits. He regarded acquired characters 
as those which result from external i~fluence upon the 
-
J. Mark Baldwin: Soc1al and Ethical Interpreta-
tions, Macmillan, N. Y., 1906, p. 67. 
Ibid, p. 68. 
Ibid, p. 73. 
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organism, in contrast to such as spring from the con-
stitution of the germ. Characters, however, can be 
inherited only in so far as their rudiments are already 
contained in the germ-plasm. Bodily modifications, 
affected by environment or by use and disuse, cannot 
be transmitted to the germ-cells from which the next 
generation springs, and therefore, cannot play any part 
in the determining of the species. To show the biolog-
leal soundness of Weismann's conclusion that bocly (soma) 
and germ-plasm are anatomically and physiologically dis-
tinct, Professor Castle and Dr. Phillips perfor~d an 
experiment upon female guinea ~igs. The ovaries of a 
female albino guinea pi~ were removed, and the ovaries 
of a female black guinea pig substituted in their place. 
When mated with an albino male, which should have pro-
duced albino pigs, the offspring were all black. She 
produced by the albino male three litters of young, all 
Of which were black. The transplanted ovarian tissue 
remained in its new environment from four to ten months 
before the eggs attained full growth, lrhich would be 
ample time for the influence of a foreign body to infl-(1) 
uence the inheritance if such were possible. 
Other exp~r1",ents have attested tbe sownness of 
the theory of Weismann and the unsoundness of the Lamarck-
ian position. Professor Tower carried on extensive 
-(1). Castle and Phillips: On Germinal Transplantation in 
Vertebrates, Car. Inst. Pub., Jo. 144, 1909. 
experiments upon potato beetles in which variations in 
temperature and humidity of the environment have been 
rollowed by variations in pigmentation. He interpret-
ed his observations, as would Weismann, that they showed, 
not inheritance of acquired characters, but direct modi-
(1) 
fication of the germ-cells, independent or the body. 
However, Professor Tower's experimentations are not to be 
I'egarded as conclusive because not reported in sufficient 
detail, and because only certain individuals were so 
lDodified. Yet, snch experiMents have unquestionably 
proved that. acquired traits are non-inheritable; and 
that before c~~ract~rs or traits can be inheritable, 
there mUst be modifications of the germ-plasm. 
The problem of heredity and disease needs but 
little t c OlrJ!1en • Cases of disease acquired by a parent 
and by him transmitted to his offspring are frequently 
I'eported; but all of these cases are capable of being 
eXPlained by _the operation of other causes. In some 
Cases, the disease germ may be conveyed directly into the 
bOdy of the parent organism through a parasite, and thus 
Pass directly into the reproductive cells. In the case 
or Texas fever in cattle, the disease is caused by a 
Protozoon which is introduced into the blood of cattle 
by a tick which carries the disease germ. The proto-
Zoan parasite is present in the egg-cell of the tick, 
~that the young tick which develops out of an infected 
(1). W. L. Tower: An Investigation of Evolution in Chry-so~el1d Beetles of the genus Leptinotarsa, Car. Inst. 
Pub., No. 48, Washington, 1906. 
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eg~ cannot fail to contain the parasite, but the dis-
euse is no more inherited than a grain of sand lodged 
(1) 
within the egg would be inherited. Similarily, in 
IDan syphilis may be transmitted, but cannot in any true 
sense be inherited. Tubercolosis may be transmitted 
from parent to child because of the unusual opportunity 
for post-natal infection. That does rtot, however, 
justify any conclusion that tubercolosis is inherited. 
It is now generally admitted that mutilations are not 
inheritable. There have been cases where a parent who 
has suffered a mutilation throut,!'h accident has produced 
Offspring similarily defective. Such cases, however, 
are to be regarded as variations, or as astonishing coin-
Despite the fact that the tails of sheep 
have been docked for many generations there has been no 
racial shortenin~ of the tail. Weismann cut off the 
tails of mice for nineteen generations in succession 
W1thout observing any inheritance of the mutilation. 
Similarily, although circumcision and tatooing have 
been practiced for many generations, yet they are not 
inheritable in the slightest degree. The conclusion to 
be reached is that disease is certainly not inheritable. 
Acquired diseases arc not transmissible from. parent to 
Offspring unless the germ-plasm is modified either 
through malnutrition, or possibly inbre.eding, in whoich 
-(1). Castle: Genetics and Eugenics, 1916, pp. 29-30. 
(1) 
cases the disease or defect may be transmissible. 
The problem of heredity and Mendel's law is not 
a problem at all. The law is "the law of heredity". 
It contains three distinct principles: (1) The existence 
of unit-characters; (2) dominance, in cases where the" · 
parents di:ffer in a unit-character; and (3) segre~ation 
of the units contributed by the respectiTe parents, 
this segregation being found among the gametes formed 
by the offspring. Professor Castle has proTed by his 
extensiTe experimentation on guinea-pigs and mice that 
(2) 
the ~endelian principles hold good in eTery case. 
Dominants are present as compared to recessives in the 
proportion of three to one. 
In applying these prinCiples to inbreeding and 
cross-breeding, as is necessary in the breeding of 
stock, the breeder can tell pretty definitely what the 
result w1ll be. Certain results from hybridization 
have been obtained. The hybrids may form a blend of 
the two parental forms; they mny show a particular 
Juxtaposition without blending; they may resemble an 
ancestral form; they may differ from their parents; or 
they may exhibit the dominant churacters of one parent, 
With the recessiTe characters of the other parent remain-
(3) 
1n~ latent. 
-(1). The dwarf stature of the Hottentot-Bushmen is prob-
ably to be accounte4 for on the ground of malnutri-
tion and inbreedin~. 
Castle: Genetics and Eugenics. 
thomson: Heredity, pp. 389-390. 
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Professor Castle reached the conclusion tlmt in-
breeding tends to bring forth homozygous (union of 
gametes which transmit the same Mendelian charact~r) 
combinations, which have a tendency to bring to the sur-
face latent or hidden recessive characters. This, he 
thinks, may be justified in the breeding oC domcstic 
stock, but not in man. Cross-breeding tends to bring 
out heterozy~ous (union oC gametes which transmit diCf-
ercnt Mendelian characters) combination" i. e., the 
(1) 
dominant characters tim t are des ired. Professor 
Castle says that "the animal breeder is therefore am-
ply justified in doing what human society at present is 
probably not warranted 1n doing, - viz:, in practicin~ 
close inbreeding in building up Camilies of superior 
eXcellence, an.d. then keeping these pure, while using theM 
1n crosses with other stocks. For an ani~al of such 
a su-perior race should haTe only vigorous, strong ofC-
spring iC mated with a healthy individual of any family 
-hatcver, within the same species. For this reason 
the production of 'thoroughbred' animals and their use 
1n crosses is both SCientifically correct and commercially 
(2) 
remunerative." 
Professor Gastle Cinds that in cross-breeding, 
Or hy.ridization, that the mating of parents belonging 
(1). Castle: Genetics and Eugenics, 1911, p. 223. 
(2). Ibid, p. 224. 
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to the same pure race and closely related to each ot}~r 
brings about a homozygous condition in which recessive 
qualities are apt to be transmitted, and will have on 
the whole practically the same effect as self-fertiliza-
tion. The mating, however, of individuals of distinct 
geographical races is apt to produce an offspring more 
Vigorous than the parents. A back cross of succeeding 
generations will bring forth the dominant factors 
present in the -first cross. The cross-breeding of 
unlike species is not good, as the offspring will either 
have great vigor but impaired fertility, or lack both 
vi~or and reproductive capacity. The hybridization of 
like individuals of the same racial stock . is apt to 
develop a more Tigorous and more virile offspring tha~ 
either of the parent stocks. An illustration of this 
is seen in the hybrid population which makes up Europe 
tOday. They are hybrids resulting from the crossing 
Of the Mediterranean, Alpine and Blonde stocks. But in 
this case the individuals were enough alike so that no 
injurious results followed; instead, the offspring were 
~ore vigorous than the parents. The dominant qualities 
Of the ancestor may manifest themselves in the progeny 
aCCording to Mendelian expectations; and a hybridiza-
(1) 
tion of like stocks is rather to be desired than avoided. 
-
(1). Thorstein B. Veblen: "The Mutation Theory and the 
Blonde Race". Art. in The Jour. of Race Develop-
ment, Vol. III, No.4, pp. 491-507. 
87 
The problem of heredity and sex is one that is 
still unsettl~d. But, if the determination of sex in 
general depends upon the inheritance of a Mendelian 
ractor dirrerentiating the 'sexes, it is very unlikely 
that the determination of sex will ever be controlled. 
As Professor Castle says, "male and feJllale zygotes should 
forever continue to be produced in approximate equality 
and consistent ineqw.l:1 ty of male and fer.lale births could 
result only frOM greater mortality of one sort of zygote 
than of the other. Only in parthenogenesis can man at 
will control sex, and until he can produce artif:l.cial 
Parthenogenesis in tile higher animals, he can scarcely 
.. (1) 
hope to control sex in such animals." 
The contention of the eu~enicists from Plato to 
those of the present day has been a ruthless attempt to 
improve the human race by using the rnethodsof the 
stock breeder. The family has occupied but little 
Place in their scheMe~ While it is not to be denied 
that moral and physical defectives should not be allowed 
to reproduce their kind, the carryin~ out of the methods 
or eugenics on a wholesale plan seems equally dangerous. 
To quote Professor Castle again: "It is of course essen-
tial that the racial stock be kept sound and rree from 
taint of disease or racial poison, but granting this, 
the situation is not so alarming as some persons seem to 
-
(1). Castle: Heredity, p. IR1. 
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think. For the normal unperverted instlnc.ts of" the 
aTeraf!"e man have a di.stlnctly eugenic trend. CUpid 
(1) 
is a safer guide in matrimony than a licensing hoard." 
Indeed it would be necessary to ~nage society like a 
stock farm if eugenics were to be successfully carried 
out. This coul4 be done most rapidly under polygamy, 
Which would permit of a comparatiTely rigid selection 
of sires; and less rapidly under monogamy by a selection 
of parents of both sexes, the offspring to be reared by 
the community, as Plato advocated. But these meUJOds 
are so contrary to the true spirit of democracy and 
indiTidual liberty' that no ciTilized community would 
care to tolerate either of them. All that we can do 
1s to teach the indiTidual all that our present know-
ledge or heredity has reTealed. We should depem upon 
the dissemination of knowlp.dge rather than upon whole-
Sale legislation until we have more solid ground on which 
to stand. Thus we are forced to adopt a negatlTe con-
(2) 
elUsion in regard to the contention of tile eugenicists. 
We may adopt ~ the following conclusions in the light 
Of Our study of heredity and Tariation: The inf"luence or 
heredity is purely physical; and acquired traits, due 
to environmental or other f"orces, cannot be inherited. 
In fact the influence of" the environment is practically 
-(1). Castle: Genetics and Eugenics, 1916, p. 27~. 
(2). Ibid, pp. 274-275. 
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negative so rar as heredity and variation are concern-
ed. In order that the acquired traits or the parents 
may be transmitted to their offspring directly there 
must be a modlrlcatlon o~ the ~erm-plasm, and such has 
not as yet been proved. The result or malnutrition, 
or alcoholism, inbreeding, etc., may be such that the 
germ-plasm is modirled, but such cases have not derinite-
ly been worked out. For the present we are warranted 
in considering these ractors to be mainly negative in 
thetr inf'luence. The laws or A1endel and WeisMann 
rorm the basis of any adequate .theory or heredity. The 
inheritance o~ dominant and recessive qualities by the 
Orf'spring proceed in the geometrical ratio o~ three to 
one; and hereditary traits are conveyed only through 
the irreducible germ-plasm round in the zygotes of' tile 
primitive sex cells. Heredity and variation, therefore, 
are not reducible to environmental ractors. The environ-
ment may play a major part in the determining of' what the 
new individual is to be, but not because it in any way 
aff'ects the germ-plasm o~ the producing organism. 
Similarily, heredity is not reducible to psychical 
factors, although social inheritance may account for the 
acquisition by the individual of' the acquired traits or 
CUlture of' the race. 
While the distinctive physical dif~erence between 
~an and other animals is his larger brain, which is due 
to the increase o~ the associational areas which are con-
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cerned with intellectual processes, this must be re-
garded as the result o~ natural selection in organic 
evolution. This unquestionably was the product o~ 
a mutation which enabled man to sUrTive in his struggle 
with the rest of the animal world, and hence was perpet-
uated by heredity and selection. In the dissimilarity 
o~ rn~n we have the result of organic variation, some 
individuals being born with favorable variations, and 
others with unfavorable variations. Some men are born . 
strong and some are born weak. The origin~l endowment 
o~ the individual depends in part upon his heredity, but 
it is also a matter of individual variation. Thus 
heredity and variation account for the biological inequal-
ity among individuals. These ori~inal variations are 
most strikingly expressed, in human society, in the facts 
of sex and race, which are to be regarded as quantitative 
rather than qualitative; i. e., they consist in the 
greater strength o~ certain natural tendencies, or 
impulses in one race, or one sex, than in another. 
All o~ this shows us how important the biological 
ractors or heredity and variation are in the working out 
or an adequate theory o~ the social ~orces. Heredity 
and variation are factors which must be reckoned with. 
They do not, however, explain the handing down ~rom gen-
eration to generation of acquired traits, which are not 
PhYsical and cannot be inherited. This brings up the 
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further proble~ of the part which is playecl by the 
psychical factors, to~ether with the possibility of 
centrally initiated nervous processes which SC~M to 
largely ~uide and control the d.estiny of the individual. 
92 
CI1APTER IV 
CENTRAJ.LY INITIATED PROCESSES 
(THE PSYCHICAL l",LCTORS) 
93 
CHAPTEH IV 
CENTRALLY INITIATED PROCESSES 
From a biological point of view mental or 
Psychical life may be regarded as a variation in the 
life cycle of the individual. As such it is a variation 
"hich natural selection has favored frol'1 the beginning 
in the organic world. The animals havin~ the best 
chance to survive in the struggle for existence would 
not be necessarily those that had developed the 
greatest physical strength, but rather those which had 
developed the greatest intelligence, which would 
enable them to adapt themselves to their environment 
and to escape the dangers which threatened them. Thus 
intelligence seems to have had a survival value far 
(1) 
in excess of mere strength. 
All organisms, however, do not have ~ntal lire, 
and some have it in only sli~ht degree. In the or,r;an:lc 
"orld we have those movements and , structures which 
appear earliest and which seem so important to simple 
(2) . 
eXistence as to be fundamental. Then, there are those 
structures which develop later and which seem necessary 
--~------------~------~~~~~=-~ 
«21» •• Cf. Ellwood: An Introduction to Social Psychology, p. ~O. cr. Bolton: Principles of Education, espec1al~y 
the chapter on "Io' rom Fundamental to Accessory • 
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only to complex existence, and which we term "accessory" 
because they are less Tital and less necessary to ex-
::Istence. The lowest and most primitiTe'or~anis~s 
Possess only the struct~res and functions which are 
necessary for existence. Man is not so. Th" lower 
ani~al8 perform the functions fundamental and nec~ssary 
to existence fully as well as man, but they lack the 
Power to perform the accessory movements. .All anir.tal 
life has undoubtedly eTolTed from Tery simple forms. 
EYen the higher animals must haTe be~un Ufe as uni-
Cellular organisms, and have become gradually differ-
entiated through the development of specialized and 
complex structures. ' The lowest organisms do not 
Possess a nerYous system and thus cannot have neural 
Processes accompanied by consciousness. Thus it 
aeems that the key to the intellectual or mental life 
ia to be found in the development of a nervous system. 
the first portion to make its appearance was the spinal I 
COrd, Which at first was a comparatiTely straight, un-
dtfferentiated , tube. Following this, the Tarious 
COllateral branches forming the peripheral system with 
the end organs of sense were eTolTed. Then, tbere was 
the specialization of one portion of the nervous sys-
te~ Which became the brain. The brain, itself, was 
~radually formed, the so ... call~d different leTels deTel-
Oping at different times. The medulla oblongata devel-
OPed first, then the d!rebellum, and lastly the cerebral 
(1) 
lObes. 
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This variation, due to organic selection, ~ade 
intelligence possihle, and, accordin~ly, we find a meas-
Ure of intelli~ence in the higher animals. But some 
time in the far remote past our half-human ancestors 
reach~d and passed the critical point where variations 
in intelligence, always impo~tant, came to be still 
more important, and natural selection reinforced by a 
series of mutations in the direction of a big~er and 
better brain JYQde man the intelligent creature that he , 
is. This increase in intelligence carried with it 
(2) 
. a prolongation of infancy. As the ~ntal life 
became more and more complex, mQre and more had to be 
left to be done during the earlier years of life. Thus 
lnan came to be born with the germs of many complex 
activities, and a long period resulted in which his 
mind was plastic and malleable in order that these 
accessory neural connections might be developed. In-
telligence seems thus to have been developed as a means 
Of control over the more complex activities of life, 
and in man this was accompanied by consciousness. The 
rn1nd came to assert a conscious control over the com-
Plex activities of man's life cycle - superior means of 
Control over complex adaptive processes. .. lS Professor 
-(1). Dol ton, ibid, ch. on "From l<~undamenta I to Accessory". 
(2). Cf. Fiske: The hleaning of Infancy. ,Fiske regards 
that the prolongation of infancy was essential to 
the evolution of mental life. 
' J 
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Ellwood says, "intelli~ence and the neural processes 
immediately involved in consciousness constitute the 
master device produced by organic evolution to perfect 
(1) 
the control of the organism over its environment." 
The pa rt which !'lind came to play in the life of 
man was that of purposive activity or active adaptation, 
a variation found useful and perpetuated through natural 
(2) 
selection. Thus the mind selects the stiMUluS to 
which it responds from the many stimuli ~hich the envir-
onment arfords. With the growth of intelll~ence in 
man there came to be social life between himself and 
his fellows. This would come to be psychic intersti~-
Ulation and response, just as soon as articulate speech 
and lanr,llage could be evolved. Articulate speech was 
Obviously due . to man's highe'" intellectual developMent. 
With it came the power to form abstract ideas, and with 
the developMent of soctal lire, centering around tt~ 
food and sex processes, the complex activities of 
CUlture or civilization had their primitive origins. 
The runuamental adaptations between individuals 
1n human groups have always rested upon instincts, also 
eVolVed by natural selection; and which have rormed the 
basis for psychic interstimu1ation and response between 
individuals of the same group. Man's instincts were 
inherent and transmitted to his progeny through inheri-
------------------------------------------------------------
( 1 ). C. A. Ell W' 0 od: 0 p • cit., p • ~ 1. 
(2). Cf. Ellwood, ibid, p. 12. 
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tance. Along with these inherent instincts, mainly 
the rood and sex instincts and those secondary ones 
arising thererrom, man also had an inderinite capacity 
ror the rormation or habits. Thus through a series or 
mutations man was endowed with a superior neural and 
mental mechanism which enabled him to rationalize his 
(1) 
experiences and to evolve ideas and inTentions. 
This enabled man to control his habits and to a~just 
himself to the new situations which coni'ronted him. 
Th""oU~h the use or concepts and articulate speech he 
Was able to hand down from generation to generation the 
knowledge which would likely proTe useful to the group. 
Thus ti'ad ttion and custOM arose which by and by grew 
into the "mores" of the group, as some customs came 
(2) 
to be approTed and others disapproved. 
The interpretation or this More complex behaTior 
Of man cannot be given in terms of habit and environment; 
· for while this procedure may be sufricient ror animal 
groups it is not adequate ror the much morc social lire 
of man. This is because the hi~her intellectual cen-
ters of the brain haTe become the chief organ of' 
adaptation in man. While environmental forces haTe 
served to select and to permanently establish the in-
tellectual traits which are inherent in man they do not 
-
(1). This chapter has been written largely in ter~s of 
Professor Ellwood's sociology and at times it has 
been difficult to get away rrorn his terrn1nolo~y. 
(2).Cf. Sumner: Folkways, chapter one. 
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account for all of his subsequent behaTior. Man's 
thinking may be largely determined by crises which have 
to do with the getting of food am the necessity for 
defense; but the higher intellectual adaptibility of 
man enables him to make inventions which help him to 
largely control his enTironmental surrourJiings. The 
biological inheritance of man has unquestionably co-
operated with his intellect in making hUMan culture and 
. human .societya possibility. While heredity and var-
fation have laid the foundation for development in the 
human as well as in the animal world, man's hi~her in-
tellectual development has modified the workin~ of 
these factors am· JIQde cultural eTolution possible. 
The intellect lms thus modified the development of 
human society and has made man's evolution a "learning 
(1) 
process", as we shall see. thus no ade'luate theory 
of the social forces can fail to take cognizance of the 
psychical factors, and the place which the intellect 
holds in determining mental interstimulation and. 
response. The psychical factors may be classified as 
(2) 
instinctiTc, emotional and intellectual. 
Instinct may be regarded as the response of her-
editary structure to stimuli either from without or ., 
from within the organism; and the term "instinct" 
(1). Cf. Ellwood, OPe cit., eh. two, "Qrganic ~olutlon 
and Social ETolution". 
Ellwood: op, cit., p. 7'. 
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may be largely confined to the hereditary activities 
or inherent reactions which characterize a ~roup or 
(1) 
individuals. Practically none or the psycholo~ists 
agree as to the nUr.1ber or human instincts. In fact, 
som~ or the more extreme behaviorists deny even the 
existence of instincts, but since psycholo~y is so 
largely based upon biology the concept of instinct, or 
its equivalent, cannot be avoided. 'th~ nf"rVOllS sys-
tern has a relatively definite hereditary structure, and 
relatively definite activities correspond to this struc-
ture, which need only an appropriate stimulus to set 
them orf. Perhaps such an elaborate list of instincts 
as the late William James gave is to be disre~arded, 
but after all, it is largely a question or terminolo~y. 
The instincts are activities based upon hereditary con-
nections within the n~rvous system. Owing to the more 
complex mental life or man, he naturally has a greater 
(1). Baldwin defines instinct as "an inherited reaction 
of the sensori-motor type, relatively complex and 
markedly adaptive in character, and common to a 
group of individuals". (J. Mark Baldwin: Diction-
ary of Philosophy and Psycholo~y, Vol. I, p. 505). 
Colvin says that "an instinctive activity 18 a 
group of reflexes organised toward some definite . 
goal and accompanied in their expression by a con-
sciouscorrelate of more or less clearness aId attend-
ed 1)\' an afft"ctive tone of great.er or less inten-
sityi. (Colvin: The Learning Process, p. 35). 
This derinition makes the !'lind the control11n~ 
fact.or in instinctive activity. McDougall defines 
an instinct as an "innate psycho-physical dispo-
sition which determines its possessor to perceive 
and pay attention to objects of a certain class, to 
expericllce an emotional excitement of a particular 
quality upon perceiving suchan object, and to act 
loa 
numbf"'r o'f instincts than otl1f~r animals. The two most 
fundamental human instincts are those connected \fi th 
the ~etting of food and those connected with sex. 
Largely gro~ing out of these two is the instinct of 
~regariousness ,,:lich gives rise to family and ~roup 
Ufe. As men begin to live in groups, the Instinct of 
imitation appears, ~hich probably sprin~s r.tore 'from 
reflection than from natiye i~pulses. Indeed, all of 
the strongly imitative animals are without exception 
gregarious. Imitation, or doing as ott~rs do, is to 
be regardc(l as one of the most important unifying fac-
tors in human society, since it tends to make uniform 
the activities of ~roups. This naturally comes about 
throll~h the medium of the mind lfhich pronounces some 
acts desirable and others undesirable; and thus the 
human instincts come to be more and more directed by 
(1) 
the psychical na t ure of man. 
, 
The modification of these instinctive activities, 
which arise through cxp~rience, or the influence of 
t.he envl ronmt"!nt, may be termed "habits". Habits, then, 
are to 1'1e regarued as l!lodifications of hereditary ner-
vous structure, ~cluired by the individual during his 
in regard to it in a particular manner, or at" 
least to experience an impulse to such action • 
(McDougall: Social Psychology, p. 29). 
(1). Cf. Tarde: The Laws of Imitation. Sec, also, 
IIobhouse: Mind in Evolution; and Eillfood: An 
Introduction to Social Psycholo~y, pp. 60-61. 
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(1) 
lifetime, but which are not inheritable. While 
habIts are due to the action of the el1Tironment, no 
habit is necessarily formed by -the mpchanical action of 
the environmf'nt upon the individual. On the con-
trary, the individual selects the stimuli from the 
environment to which he responds. When the individ-
ual has responded in the same way several times to the 
same stimulus, and adaptl.'"u. himself' to it, a habit is 
established. This becomes "persistent after there 
llave been sufficient resJlonses, anu. by -am by, it may 
become as much a part of the indtvi1ual as his original 
nature. Habit becones extremely important both for 
the individual and for society. It largely determines 
the behavior of the individual, because hdbit deter-
mines the way he ~ill respond. Habit is thus the raw 
material on which cultural evolution must act; and 
Mant"s capacity to aCf{uirc an indefinite number ot 
(2) 
habits lies at the very basi~ of civilization. 
Doth instinct and hablt, however, adjust the in:lividual 
only to past environments, and are therefore inaderyuate 
in determining his future behavior. With the evolution 
of civilization there is a constantly changing social 
life, and habits must change with the changing condi-
t ions. As old habits are given up, new habits must be 
(1). See Ellwood: An Introduction to Social Psycholo~y, 
p. 62. 
(2). This is because habits when adopted by th~ group 
tend to become "mores". 
taken on, in order that man may constantly adapt him.;.. 
self to his environment. Tn this process feeling and 
(1) 
thought play their part. 
}4'eeling furnishes an internal agency ror selec-
tion wherein learning, or profiting from past experience, 
becomes available to the individual. Physiologically, 
the basis of distinction is within the feelings them-
selves; that is, the reaction to-~timulus results in 
either a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Munster-
berg says: "If the stiMulus is pleasant the bodily move-
ments tend to make it go on; if it is unpleasant, the 
bodily mOTements tend to stop it. If the stimulus is 
disagreeable, the organism reacts by a contraction of 
the flexor muscles. If the impression is a~reeable, 
the organism expands, and the extensor muscles are 
(2) 
actiTe." Munsterberg regards the impression as 
vivid "hen the central excitement- finds the channels 
of Motor discharge open; and the iMpression as becom-
ing localized when the central e~cltement is carried 
into a particular channel. The excitement is pleas-
ant or unpleasant Just as it is starting a movement 
(1) 
of approach or withdrawal. Thus there sce!'lS to be 
a strengthening or weal{ening of the excitement caused 
(1). Cf. Ellwood, ibid, p. 64. 
(:?). Munsterber~: Psycholog:y: General and .Applied, 
s. Y., 1014, pp. 193-199. 
(1). Ibid, 'Pp. 200-201. 
by the lower nervous centers. When strengthened the 
feeltng experienced is that or pleasantness; when weak-
cned, the reeling is that of unpleasantness. Thus 
those }Iabits which tend to become habitual are usually 
a.ccompanied by a feelin!!; of pleasantness; and converse-
1y, those which are not likely to become habitual do 
not because accompanied by a feeling of unpleasant-
ness. Thus feeling is the reaction of the organism to 
an activity or a stimulus, and is largely a subjective 
(1) 
and individualistic matter. Although the hedonistic 
psycholo!':y "'hi.ch made pleasure and pain the sole ,"otiTes 
to action, and feeling the original form of consc1.ous-
ness, has been ~iven up, nevertheless, feeling does 
play an important part in human society_ AS Professor 
Ellwood says, "customs, institutions, and Mores are 
embedded 1n feeling" <A.nd chan,ge is sometimes difficult 
(2) 
to be obtained because of that fact. Because feel-
in~ so strongly reenforces instinctive arrl habitual 
activities it has a large place in the determination 
of" behavior, since it inrluences the irrlividual's res-
ponse to stimuli. It surely is to be considered a 
psychical factor which modifies the response of the 
individual to his en~lronment. 
( 1) • 
(2). 
Ebbin,ghauss says that "feeling is a reliable sym-
ptom and witness only for the present and local 
utility of the relation between the organism and the 
world. It is not a prophet of the future. Disease 
May result from eating sweets, whereas Medicineois 
often bitter". (Psychology, Tr. Dy Max Meyer, l uOS, 
p. 8:].) 
Ellwood, OPe cit., p. 64. 
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The part which the intellect plays in the hehav-
lor of man is of even More si~nificant importance. 
The intellect is that objective, cognitive side of the 
.... . .. 
mind which is concerned with the adaptation of the 
(1) 
organism to its environment. Through the media of 
sensation, apperception, the formatIon of concepts, 
and reasoning it determines man's attitude toward his 
environ!'lcnt. Sensation functions in keeping the mind 
informed of bodily and environmental actiTities. The 
sense organs are nerve structures especially adaptf'd to 
pick up a c~rtafn type of information. For instance, 
the eye responds to light sensat:tons, the ear to sound 
sensations, the sldn to sensations of pressure and 
place, the tern~rature spots to sensations of warmth 
(2) 
and cold, and so on. All work .together in bringing 
(1). Ellwood, ibi<1, p. 67. 
(2). Professor Dewey says that "the brain is both ana-
tomically and "functionally a single (or, at most, 
dual) organ. There is, of course, a great deal 
of specialization, and even of localization of 
function ,d thin it. Centres of s t~ht, hearing and 
touch are more or less spatially as well as func-
tionally distinct. But there is reason to believe 
that this specialization, litre the correspondi~ 
division of labor in society, is acqUired, not 
original, resting upon the principles of economy, 
or the richest result with the greatest ease. ETcn 
with the most extreme localization, there is no 
separation of sensory centres. The centres for 
s1.l!:ht, for touch, for mOTement, etc., are all 
interwoven into one larger whole. With the move-
ment of specialization, or dlffer~ntiation, J!,oes a 
movement of reunion, of interconnection. While, 
for exaMple, the auditory centre may be constantly 
gaining in distinctness of localization, it is also 
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about adjustment. As Professor Bagley says: "Adjust-
ment is the end toward which sensation is the means; 
and the process of adjustment or unifyin~ and malc1n~ 
si~nificant the data furnished by sensation is known 
(1) 
as apperception." Through apperception the per-
ceived object becomes apperceived and experiences are 
assimilated with reference to the primitive needs of 
the organism, which are represented by the in~tincts. 
• • • 
As development continues, these primitive needs corne to 
be overshadowed by acquired needs, which are represented 
by outgrowths of instincts modified by experiel'lCe and 
assimilated. 
The formation of concepts and of reasoning comes 
first from judgments. When we face a ~iven situation 
in which past experience is consciously brou~ht to 
bear upon the solution of the situation a jUdgment is 
(2) 
reached. The practical judgnent involves the con-
scious application of concrete experience, recalled in 
gainin~ in multifariousness of connection with 
other sensory centres. Physiological consider-
ations, in fine, instead of pointing to original 
atomic sensations, point to u massive homogeneous 
sensation, gradually (lifferent iated, indeed, but 
at the same ~ime, with these different sensations 
bound into a whole." (John Dewey: Psychology, 
pp. 34-15). 
(1). Dagley: The Teaching Process, N. T., 1~15, pp. 
66-67. Cf. Dewey, who defines apperception as 
"the reaction of mHld by means of its organized 
structure upon the sensuous material presented 
to it". 
(J). Bagley, ibid, p. 110. 
the same sort of sensation in which it originally oc-
curred; and the reaction is made to the present situ-
(1) 
ation on the basis of the former reaction. Some 
of the higher animals are capable of such behavior, 
for example, the opossum shams death when confronted 
by danger. But in what is called the conceptual 
judgment, the experiences of the past becoMe massed 
and condensed, amI the form of jUdgment resulting is 
called the ~conceptual judgment" because a process of 
thinking by the use of concepts is involved. This 
power ~an does not share with the higher animals; 
it is his alone. Furthermore, man can use the 
finished product of a conceptual jUdgment, which may 
itself function as a condeBsed experience in facing 
new situations. The use of conceptual judgments 
gives rise to reasoning, a gifP which man alone 
possesses. Professor Dewey has adMirably analyzed 
a complete act of thought. First, there must be 
the occurrence of a difficulty in which there is 
lack of adaptation of means to end. Second, there 
must follow the definition of the difficulty. Third, 
there must be the occurrence of a suggested explana-
tion or possible solution through hypothesis and test-
ing. Fourth, there is the solution of the problem 
(1). See 1I0bhouse: Mind in Evolution, Ch. VI. 
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throu~h the elaboration of an idea and by experimenta-
tion. Fifth, there must be a verification of the 
conjectural idea and the formation of a concluding 
(I) 
belief. This is reasoning, an act which no animal 
is capable of, and an act which can in no way be 
attributed to environmental factors· Thus reason-
ing becomes the hi~hest function of the intellect. 
The neural processes involved in intelli~ence· 
come to have a survival value of their own ov~r and 
above instinct, habit, or feeling. Civilized man has 
come to depend less and less upon instinct, habit and 
feeling; because for him the intellect, especially the 
reason, bas become the chief factor in the gUidance of 
(2) 
his behavior. While the origins of social behav-
ior are still to be found in the instincts and habits, 
which are largely molded by the environment, it is the 
intellect that makes social change or adaptation possible. 
It has thus been through the intellectual elements that 
bUl'lan society has. received the distinct traits which 
distinguish it from animal association. The intellect 
is to be regarded as the delicate instrument of indi-
vidual and social adaptation, and must be recognized 
as an increasing factor, as social evolution goes on, 
in social change and adaptation. The intellect of man, 
(1). John Dewey: How We Think, 1910, ch. VI, "The Anal-
ysis of a Complete Act of Thou~ht". 
(2). Ellwood, OPe cit., p. 68. 
. , 
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which results from his lar~e brain and increased ner-
vous connections, expresses itself, first, throu~h the 
media of articulate speech, and secondly .through lang-
uage, which becomes the vehicle of tradition. Thirdly, 
through invention and. discov~ry man has slowly succced-
cd in conquering the forces of nature and has adapted 
(1) 
theM to his use. Thus the psychical factors, 
which proceed from the mind, and culminate in the 
. 
intellect, have a ri~ht to attention and certajnly are 
not reducible to environmental factors. 
This leads us directly to the problem of "cen-
trally initiated nervous processes". At present, 
psychologists and physiologists, except possibly the 
radical "behaviorist" school, regard that mind plays 
an important part in the life of man. The mind Is 
kept informed of what takes place in various parts 
of the body by means of sensations which function 
through the sense organs. Each of these sense or-
gans is a nerve structure especially adapted to conrey 
certain impression to the mind or brain. As it is 
necessary that the movements and life of the organism 
be governed in accordance with bodily needs and with 
the external environment, sensation furnishes the 
channel throurrh which are registered the stimuli upon 
which adJustment must depend. Adjustment thus be-
(1). Ellwood: OPe cit., pp. 70-72. See, also, natzel 
on "Invention and Discovery" in Thomas: Source 
Dook for Social Ori~ins, pp. 426-4~5. 
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comes the end toward which sensation is the lOOans. 
This does not imply, however, that this purposcrul di-
rection or sensation is present in man rrom birth. 
Indeed, when the infant begins to receive sense im-
press ions rrom the outer environment, these impress-
ions are devoid or the same meanin~ that an adult 
would attach to them. They are not connected In a 
unitary impression, but remain a continuous complex 
or conscious changes which constitute, to use Proressor 
James's apt characterization, "a big, blooming, buzz-
tng Conrusion." With the growth of the nervous con-
nections during the prolonged period or inrancy, these 
chaotic impressions begin to take on new forms, and the 
vague, undifferentiated mass or sensation and feeling, 
mainly connected with the satisraction of hlmger, 
comes to hc resolved into purposeful units - into 
objects and proces~es that bear a direct rererence to 
the infant's existence. When a stimulus is present-
ed to the child a reaction rollows. The stimulus 
gradually becomes a sensation, although the child 
may be conscious of it only in va~ue and incoherent 
(1) 
rashion. While a reaction rollows a stimulus, the 
initiation of this reaction is unconscious, since the 
reaction is more or less instinctive. Gradually, ho,,-
(1). Ba~ley, Ope cit., p. 61. 
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ever, the child begins to respond to stimuli in much 
the same way throul!:h instinctivead.1ustment, and soon 
the stimulus comes to Mean a definite type of res-
ponse. As Professor lIobhouse pojnts out, the first 
effect of experience upon adjustment is to confirm or 
(1) 
inhibit an inherited reaction. 
Thus it seems that the most primitive of mental 
functions has its basis in the inherited structure of 
the nervous system, and that throllP.:h instinctive ad-
justments the {lata of sensation is combined into pur-
poseful units by means of the sensations of strain 
(2) 
arisin~ fro~ the reaction. Later the sensations 
of strain corne to play the role of centralizin~ or uni-
fying agencies! and to resolve the data with which the 
senses furnish liS into deftnlte, coherent and purpose-
ful · unities whichp.:,o to Make up consciousness. As 
Daldwin poin~s out, the motor processes are extreMely 
important in reco~ition and assimilation, "the sense 
of assimilation in each successive appearance of tile 
same objective· content varies with the different shades 
of attention, Just as it also varies for the different 
sense qualities by reason of the different moto~ asso-
ciations, strains, etc., involved in accomodating to 
(3) 
the different sense qualities." Again; Professor 
(1). Mind in Rvolution, p. R5 ff. 
(2). Ba~ley, Ope cit., p. 71. 
(3). Baldwin: Mental Development, 1895, pp. ~10-~lt. 
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Baldwin says, "every two el~ments whatever, connected 
together in consciousness, are so only because they 
(1) 
have motor e~rects in common." Pro~essor Stout, 
also, emphasizes the fundamental significance of the 
kinaesthetic or motor elements when he says: "Percep-
tual process is penetrated through and throu~h by 
experiences of movement. Passive sensations only 
, (2) 
serve to guide and define motor activities." 
Perhaps an even better summary or growth am 
development or sensation into consciousness is that 
~iven by Professor Kin~, who says: "The differentta-
tion of the special forMs of sense experience from 
the primary ~eneral consciousness takes place as a fun-
ction or the child's increasing demands ror fuller ac-
tivity. The connections are macle possible on the sen-
sory side because they have first occurred, or been 
made necessary, on the active side. The infant 
repeatedly finds the same complexes of sensations 
connected with a certain set of activities. The 
activity is a unit, and the group of ,eye, ear and 
tactual sensations become inextricably bound up with 
the act, and perhaps comes to be syrnbolic of it; the 
reinstatement of one of the sensations serving to call 
(1). Baldwin, Opt cit., p. ~lt. 
(2). G. T. stout: Analyticpsycholo~y, London, 18<}6, 
Vol. I, pp. 212-21~. 
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up the images of the ottrrs as it sets up the activi ty 
for which it stands. The unity is the reference of 
the sensations which comes in on the side of the act. 
Later, when the object is known as an object, the 
sensations are easily transferred to it, or, rather, 
the object seen is ·recognized as the one touched or 
seen, because it has been the basis of a previous sin-
gle activity. If it were not for the connecting 
activity, .there would be absolutely no ground on which 
tl1e senses could be brought together in their reference, 
and thus l)ecome more than mere undefined modifications 
of the general tonus of consciousness •••••• It is only 
as something is done wi t .h the ob jec t and the various 
senses cooperate in the doing, that their unity of ref-
erence appears ••••• The child's first objects are really 
certain possible activities that are symbolized by cer-
(1) 
tain sensations involTed in performing the acts." 
This does not, howeve .... , necessitate the reducin!'; of 
neural processes to feeling, for each sensation, of 
course, has its neural correlate. The stimulus from 
the outside or inside environment sets the sensations 
in motion, and this is registered in the associational 
areas or centres where the mind uses it as raw material 
in determinin~ the reaction of the individual toward 
the sensation which the stimulus has set in motion. 
(1). Irvin~ King: Psycholo~y of Child Development, 1~01, 
pp. 16-:17. 
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Thus it seems highly probable that the mind 
exists for the purpose of adjusting the organism to its 
environment in conformity with the sensations which 
keep the mind informed of the state of this environrr~nt. 
The arrangement of sensory systems, associational sys-
tems, and motor systems within the nervous system seems 
to warrant the conclusion that the ultimate test of all 
nervous action is adju,gtment; and it is in terms of ad-
justed response that the intermediate sensory and intel-
(1) 
lectual processes acquire meaning and significance. 
We have seen that increase in intelligence in the animal 
series is correlated with increase in delicacy and nice-
(2) 
ty of motor coordination. And, as Professor ilagley 
says, "on the anatomical side, this delicacy of coor-
dination is representea by an increase in the diameter 
of the pyramidal tracts - lar~e bundles of fibers that 
carry the motor impulses from the cerebral cortex to 
centres in the ventral and lateral portions of the 
spinal cord, whence their impre~sions are distributed 
along the motor nerves to the muscles. Now the ~reat-
er the number of fibers, the more complete is the con-
trol that the higher centres exercise over the bodily 
movement, and the more accurate are the coordinations 
and adjustments with which the organism can Meet defi-
nite situations of the environment. As one would natural-
ly expect the diameter of the pyramidal tracts is found 
(1). Bagley, Ope cit., pp. 76-77. 
(2). See above, p. 56. 
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to be relatively much greater in man than in the lower 
animals. There are recognized in the cerebral cortex 
several distinct areas that are concerned with the reg-
istry or dirrerent sensations. Pressure, temperature, 
organic and kinaesthetic (motor) sensations are located 
in the great central region, formerly called the "motor 
:r.one", but now generally recognized as containing sen-
sory as well as motor centres, and known as the "som-
aesthetic" area. The visual sensations are registered 
in the occipital lobes, the aUditory sensations in the 
temporal lobes, the smell sensations in the region of 
(1) 
the hippocampal gyre, etc." These various sense 
areas occupy, however, only about one-third or the sur-
race or the cerebral hemispheres. What is the function 
or the remaining areas of the cortex? Professor Paul 
Fleichsig of Leipzig discovered that cells in the silent 
areas have no direct connection with the lower centres 
of the midbrain and the spinal cord; i. e., they neither 
receive impressions from the outer world nor send. orders 
directly to the muscles. They are, however, connected 
by fibers with the sense areas. The inference is that 
the cells in this extensive area lying between the occi-
pital, parietal and temporal lobes receive ribers rrom 
the cells of the visual, a~itory and somaesthetic areas, 
and that these Intermedi~te areas runction in connect-
lng the different sense areas. 
(1). Ba~ley: OPe cit., p. 77. 
(2). Paul Flechsig: Ueber die 
. Vor~ange, LeIpzig, 1R96, 
(2) 
If this position is 
Localisation der gcistigen 
Gehirn and. Seele, 1896. 
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at all tenable, and it see~s to find some support from 
pathology, as we shall see, it establishes a sure foun-
dation for the view that this area is the center of 
"central nervous processes" which receive the sensations 
of the individual and conveys them to the mind, or in-
tellect, for its selective reaction upon them. 
if v~lid, would prove the theory of centrally initiated 
nervous processes by which the individual (man) uses 
his mind as an important factor in the regulation and 
control of his environment throulrh a ratiocination ( 1 ) 
process. 
The mental disturbance known as "apraxia" seems 
to throw some light upon the problem. Individuals 
afflicted with apraxia cannot function normally; i. e., 
many of the sensations which come to tbem are meaning-
less because they are unable to grasp th~ si~nificance 
which a nonnal individual attaches to objects of the 
everyday life. The sense organs may functions per-
fectly; i. e., the nerves that carry th~ sense im-
pressions to the cortex may be normal. The trouble is 
(1). This theory receives some indirect support from 
such an ohjective physiolo~ist as Judson Herrick, 
who says: "The term correlation is applied to 
those combinations of the afferent impulses with-
in the sensory centres which provide for the in-
tegration of these impulses into the appropriate 
or adaptive r"sponses; in other words, the corre-
lation centres determine what the reaction to a 
~iven combination of stimuli will be." (Judson 
Herrick: ~m Introduction to Neurology, Phila., 
w. B. Saunders and Co., 1915, p. ~5). This 
is exactly what those who contend that centrally 
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centr4l in that it lies in the cortex itselr. There 
is mental deterioration in that the patient approaches 
the condition or a child. He sees an object or 
touches it, just as the inrant may, but the past ex-
p~riences that should enable him to read into the ob-
ject its normal meaning have become dissociated rrom 
sen~e and touch impressions. 
In mental disturbance, there seeMS to be a revp.r-
sal in the mental processes. As certain areas become 
disturhed and their function lost, the mental power of 
the patient decays. Dr. Diefendorf says: "In advanced 
deterioration self consciousness ultimately disappears. 
In dementia praecox and paresis this is the usual ter-
minus or the mental life. It is to be especially em-
phasized, however, that this is not the result of deter-
ioration but a special syJ!Jptoni of these diseases. In 
some cases, on the other hand, even when the store of 
ideas is much impoverished the patient still retains 
his self consciousness and can ~ive an account or his 
own condition. This is particularly COMmon in epilep-
tics. Even in presbyophrenia, where, on account of the 
marked disturbance of attention, experiences disappear 
initiated nervous processes control the reactions 
to combinations of stimuli accept. If we sub-
stitute "ar~as for centrally initiated nervous 
processes" , for "the correlation- centres", we are 
in agreeMent with Herrick. 
(1). a. B. Evarts: Report of a Case or Aphasia and 
Apraxia, N. Y. Med. J., 1914, Vol. 100, pp. 1191 ff. 
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'Zk. entirely from ~ory and are replaced by the freest 
(1) 
invention, self conRciousness is retained." In 
other words, certain associational areas may no lon~er 
continue to function while otheBcontinue to function 
in a norMal way. 
Activity and self assertiveness in man are hard-
ly to be accounted for unless certain areas in th~ 
brain do control certain acts. Thus it seems that 
from this anatomical and patholo~ical evidence that 
centrally initiated nervous processes may function in 
the determination of the behavior of the indivi1ual, 
in determining what his reaction to stimuli must be. 
If this can be maintained it certainly shows that the 
psychical elements involved in aSRociation cannot be 
reduced to mere environmental or hereditary factors; 
and that the psychical factors predominate in shaping 
the raw material which the environnent furnishes thet'1, 
while the hereditary instincts, impulses, etc" only 
give the organiHm what it haR to start with. Thii'l 
point of view would necessitate holdin~ that the psy-
chic elements involved in individual bphavior are also 
found in the behavior of groups of individuals, or 
society as a whole. To this the objectivist would 
respond tJlat such a subjective view leaves out of ac-
count the neural correlates involved in such subjective 
terMS as "mind", "feeling", "idea", "belief", "value", 
(1) A. Ross Diefendorf: Clinical Psychiatry, 1907, p. 61. 
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etc. This is not true, because the psychical process-
es include, of course, their neural correlates. While 
a stimulus may be regarded as a physical a~ent which 
acts upon sensory or motory receptors, the reaction 
does not ahfays follow apart from mind. .Lll thou~h 
ideas or images cannot lle considered stimuli in the 
sense that they may be used to account for bp.havior, 
yet their neural correlates may worl{ much as st1,muli 
would. Thus the idea may determine the stimuli, or, 
at least choose between two conflicting stimuli. In 
this way the mind seems to have for its main function 
the performance of a selective process in choosin~ 
from several stimuli the one to which the organism is 
to respond. In this sense thought may be regarded as 
the cause of our activity, if our theory of centrally 
initiated processes is valid, since it evaluates stim-
uli and chooses the ones which seem the most rational 
to the individual. " In the same way, throu.!!:h the 
interchange of ideas and through mental interstimula-
tion and response between individuals, the social mind 
is evolved. 
To this sort of social theory Professor Bernard 
objects. lIe says that the problem ahead of the 
sociolo~ists "is to push further back the analysis 
of objective phenomena." He continues, "as psychol-
o~y retreats from its introspective analysis of the 
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of tile solipsistic self, and as ethics gives up mere 
intention as the criterion of morality, so sociolo~y 
must turn from a subjective classification of social 
forces and study the functionin ,~ of objective social 
(1) 
processes as they operate in individuals and groups." 
He implies that one cannot know the content of other 
minds rrom the intros~ective study or his own mind. 
This is largely true, but if tile content of a suffi-
cient nunber of minds is studied, the general result 
will be that solipsism is avoided, and that the con-
tent of what may be termed "the social mind may be 
reached; and this can surely be made objective. 
A new development of the introspective psychol-
o~y which the more extre~e behaviorists so strenuous-
ly object to, is to be found in the work of the 
Freudian school of psycho-analysis. This school, 
under the leadership of Sigmund Freud, has devoted 
itself to the interpretation of the mental phenom-
ena of hysteria, the neuraesthenic-neuropathtc and 
allied states. By means of a method terMed "psycho-
analysis~, the hIdden origin of various phobias and 
other obscure mental states is unraveled; painful and 
long repressed memories are given free vent, and the 
patient cured. The It'rcudlans have unfortunately been 
obsessed by the single factor of sex. They consider 
(1). L. L. Bernard: The Transition to an Objective 
Standard of Soc ial Control, Ch lca,go, tD11, p. 75. 
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that every symptoM, every phobia, delusion, inpulse 
or obsess ion, has its origin in H ie repressed memory 
of some sexual experience, or in some sexual trauMa 
received in childhood. Every drea~, accordin~ to 
tl1ern, has a sexual ori~in, a sexual content, and a 
sexual sf~nlficance. Thus Freud considers that 
dreams constitute a powerful factor in the production 
(1) 
of r.ental symptoMs. 
Freud concludes tlJat the lapses of MeMory are 
tile result of a Mental action which he terns "rcllres-
sion" (Verdrangunp;); Rnd as the motive of this repres-
sion he reco~nizes feelings of aversion or dislike. 
That the psychic forces have brougtJt about this rep-
l'cssion, he recognizes in the resistance wt-iich is off-
cred to the memory reproduction. The factor of this 
resistance IllS become one of the fundamental features 
of his tL~ory. lie ~egards that the ideas which under 
these circumstances are derivatives of tile sUflpressed 
psychic p::l.ctures; are transforMations of thE' same, 
the direct result of the resistance offered to their 
reproduction. The greater tte resistance, the great-
er is this transfor~ation. It is in this relation of 
these undesigned ideas to the suppressed memory that 
there Is found the thera!lcutic indication of Freud's 
(1). Freud's original work is entitled "Traumleutung". 
The English translation by A. A. Brill is ent::l.tl~d 
"The Tnternretation 6f Dreams", N. Y., 191~. 
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metllOd. If' we possess, he · adds, a rtcthod which 
renders it possible to gain access frOM the involun-
tary ideas to the sll!"pressed ones, from tIle tpansfor-
mat jon to the ori~fnal ideas, we make previously undis-
covered subconscious factors accessll)le to conscious-
(1) 
ness. 
It'reud further bf"lieves that in the study of 
dreams we have a method of access to repressed J"lerr:or-
He regards thf" dream-content us a compound of 
a number of psychic elements. He compares it to the 
composite family photo~raphs of Galton. To tlle pro-
c~ss of condensation are due the collpctive and mixed 
conce~tionR of persons and the stran~e mixed pictures, 
creations, and anil"lal combinations which dreams so 
often present. Every eleMent of a dream is the 
representative of Much disr'arate matel~ia1. Again, 
the apparent dream content and the latest dream-content 
differ from eacll other. During tl~ process of elic-
fting the latter; i. e., the Material obtained by the 
unrestrained association of ideas ensuin~ on giving 
one's sclf up to dwelling on the dream, th,.. mind passes 
froM the thoughts and conceptions to whicb it by right 
belongs to others which have no claiM to such an 
emphasis or importance. It is this process which has 
( 1) • The sumrni:Lry of Freud's views which is here pre-
sented is largely taken from E. B. Holt, "The 
Freudian Wish", N. Y., 1!J 15; and W. A. Whi te, 
"Mechanisms of Character Forrration: An Intro-
duction to Psychoanalysis", N. Y., 1916. 
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to do witll the concealment of the ['Jeaning of the dream 
and with Makin~ it intelli~ible. This process, to 
whi.ch Freud ascribes great importance, he terms 
"dreaJ!1 displacement" (Traumverschiebung). The 
essential condition of this displacement is purely 
psychological. It is of tile nature of a play of 
Motives or activation. We ascertain t~e CaUse of 
tbis activation of motives when we realize that we are 
compelled to break off in communicuting the contents 
of a dream because thou.~htH present theMselves which 
cannot be revealed - cannot be spoken of to others -
without the injury of considerations of a personal or 
private character. Freud asserts that this is true 
of the content of eve~y dream, that every dream contains 
thoughts w},1 ch necess 1 tate privacy. Tf tIre individ-
ual investIt!ates the drearn-tholl~ht for h1",sclf, he 
arriyes finally at thou~Jlts 1'ihicJl surprise tim, which 
he did not Inlow existed in him, and which appear st.range 
and unpleasant • . 
must be resisted. 
For this reason these tJlOu~hts 
Freud says that he cannot do other-
wise than to suppose thut these thoughts are really 
present in his soul-life (his sUb-ccnsciousness), and 
possess a certain psychic intensIty or energy, but 
because they have been in a peculiar psychologic situa-
tion, tbey could not be known to him - CQuid not reac~ 
his consciousness. lIe terms this condition "repres-
12~ 
sion" (Verdran~ung). He says that lIe cannot ref'rain 
f'rom concluding that between the obscurity of' tIle 
dream content and the condition or repression there 
is a causal relationship. Theref'ore, he regards 
that dreams have to be obscure in order that the 
tabooed dream-thoughts mi~ht not reveal themselves. 
The misrepresentation of' the dream serves to conceal 
the lattpr. 
Freud believes that the "dream-work" (TrauJ!1ar-
beit), is one of a series or psychic processes to 
wlJich the origin of hysteria symptOMS, phobias, 
obsessions, and delusions are to be ascribed. Con-
densat10n and es~ci.ally displacement are characters 
never lacking in the other processes as well. Freud 
believes that a whole train of phenomena of the 
every-dR.}" life of normal ind ivicluals, such as forget-
fulness, unconscious mistakes in speech, in simple acts 
and other errors, are due to analogous pSyCllic Diechan-
(1) 
isms. lIe .regat:"ds that even in the deepest sleep a 
certain degree of psychic activity is present which 
manifests itself as a sort of lI"atchf'ulllf'SS or guardian-
ship over the sleeper. This guardian-like attention 
or watchrulness concerns itself', among f)ther th1.ngs, 
with a suppressed desire, and forms with tllc latter 
the dream, which is a co~pronise or this watchfulness 
(1). SigMund I<'reud: PsychopatlJology of the Everyday 
Life, Tr. by Brill, K. Y., 1914. 
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and the suppressed desire. Thus a kind or psychic 
relit!r j s produced for tIle suppressed wish, for the 
-dream represents the wish as fulfilled. 
Freud has restricted these occurrences to purely 
sexual ha!-,penin~s, the so-callro. sexual traumata; and 
believes that the symptoms have their origin in some 
sexual action or aggression which n~y have happened in 
childhood. In taking this position he unquestionably 
~oes too far; but, as he says, "the manifold sexual 
currents ~lay no insignificant part in these renressed (1) . 
reeI1n~s." It Must be adMitted that the sexual 
i~rulses play no little part, especially in mental con-
fUcts which (l1sturb the normal thouglJt-current of the 
individual. The sex iMpulse or instinct surely plays 
a large pa rt in the mental I ife of the abnorJr'.a1 indi-
vidual, and some little part in the life of the normal 
(1) 
individual as well. 'fhis surely cannot be reduced 
to environmental factors. 
Furthf"rMore, Freud has shown through his psycho-
analytic method that hidden and. obscure mentul state!.! 
are repressed in the conscious state, and seek to find 
expression in the subconscious state in the form of 
dreams, and the like. His evidence has clearly de~on-
~tratcd that "consciousness" is not a non-entity; hut 
(1). Ibid, p.~~1. 
(2). Cf. Thomas, Sex and. Soci.ety, Ghicago, 1907. 
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thdt, on the other hand, it does exist and is very 
real and personal. If conscious processes are 
repressed tJlrou~h the op~ratlon of psychic processes 
which dictate this repression on the basis of fcelln~s 
of aversion and dislike, then surely there Must be 
centrally initiated nervous processes which control 
this resistance to me~ory reproduction. When the 
individual is asleep, in other words, is no lon~er 
conscious, the ~ind; Le., the associational areas 
which control tllinking, is no longer active and has to 
manifest itself in the sub-conscious processes. The 
painful and unpl~asant memories, lrhich one in his con-
ecious state would repress can no longer be repressed 
because of the inactivity of these "centrally initiated 
nervous processes, and must nanifest themselves In the 
form of dreams and the like. This evidence sec~s to 
clearly establish the fact of centrally initiated 
nerv ous processes in which the mind func t ions as tile 
controlling agent In th<" deternination of behavior. 
The anatomical a.m. pa. tholo~1cal ev Idellce which has been 
offered seems to prove the case; at any rate the con-
trary, as yet, has not been demonstrable. So, ~n the 
whole, we believe that we are justified in forming at 
least an inconclusive conclusion that centrally 
initiated nervous processes are highly probable -
a position that nay be regarded as tenable until the 
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the contrary has been proved by the weight of suffi-
cient evidence. 
Thus the necessity of including the psychic 
factors in any ade'lua te tl leory of tile soc ial forces 
is at once apparent. The part which the mind, and 
the psychic processes which proceed from the actiTities 
of the Mind. play in the behavior of man is unques-
tionably important, and cannot be scientifically stated 
in terMS of the envi romrent. Such a view does not 
neces~arily discount the importance of the environ-
mental factors - econonic or geor,raphical; but it 
does insist that these latter factors do not play tile 
whole part in the determination of r.1an's social ac-
tions. The biolo~ical factors serve merely to give 
. the individual the na tive equipment with which he be-
gins life; the environMental factors function in their 
infl uence upon him; but the !'sycld cal forces func t ion 
as selective agents in the molding of plastic heredi-
tary structur~, and the controlling of environr.lental 
stimuli. Furthermore, it Is largely tllrough tile 
oper'ation of these psychical forces that soc1al life 
is macie poss ible. Through mental interstimulation 
and response, functioning through articulate speech, 
lanr-:uare , custOMS, trad:ltions. invention and discovery, 
mankind learns to live in groups, in soci.eties. Thus 
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these psychical factors function in the evolution of 
culture, which b~cornes essentially a "learning pro-
cess". 
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CHAPTER V 
APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION 
Let us now see how these different sets or 
factors function in the evolution of culture or 
c ivili:lation. It is held by many sociologists that 
custom and tradition play one of the most important 
parts in this evolution of culture, as other ractors 
function largely through them. Various theories have 
been proposed but only a few or them need to be 
noticed here. 
The late Proressor Sumner or Yale proposed 
(1) 
the doctrine of "the folkways". lIe held tJ1at men 
begin with acts rather' than thoughts, that need was 
the impelling rorce, and sensations of pleasure and 
pain largely determined the course to be followed. 
This would go on not only in individuals, but also in 
groups. Thus habit, routine and skill were develop-
ed. Ways of doing things that were expedient would 
corne to be selected, each new generation profiting 
by the experi~nce of the past until all at last would 
co~e to have the same way of doin~ things, which in 
time would become "custom". As time went on, in-
(1). Folkways, N. Y., 1907. 
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stincts were developed in connection with these "cus-
tOMS", and thus ~roll~ays" arise. When the group 
became convinced that tbese "customs" were essential 
to group welfare, t~en the rolJ~ays became converted 
into "mores". Sumner defines the "mores" as "the 
ways or doing t~ings which are current in a society 
to satisry human needs aOO desires, togetllf'!r with the 
faiths, notions, codes and standards or well-living 
which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connec-
(1) 
t ion "i th tllem." 
Proressor Keller atteJT1pted to reconstruct his 
predecessor's theory or tile "rolkways" in the li~ht 
of Darwinian evolution. He holds that civilization 
in thf'! aspect of its power over nature is really 
adaptation and not Mastery. He regards man as only 
partially rree, because he is lar~ely bound by custom 
and convention. Especially is this true aJT10ng sav-
age tribes where custom and taboo deterr.tine just what 
each new e;eneration riust be. Prores50r Keller says: 
"convention penetrates where statutes are not; and 
enacted laws are no more than the crystallization or 
certain of the more tangible manirestutions of civili-
zation. If we wish to get down to rundarnentals aOO 
so arrive at the Ja1dden sprin~s of societal lire and 
(t). Ibid, p. 59. 
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evolution, we must seek them in the societal conven-
(1) 
tiona and in public opinion." 
Prof'essor Kell~r considerR that hmr.an evolution 
is bound up with the evolution or culture or civili-
zation; i.e., social evolution is bound up in cul-
tural evolution. The develop~ent or the culture 
attained depends upon tl~ amount of adaptation which 
the individual or the group can make. Here, Keller 
make", the mistake of confusing social and cultural 
evolution; since social evolution is the evolution of 
con~unittes and their organizution, while cultural evo-
lution is the attainment or culture or civilization. 
We are not concerned here with social evolution, but 
pril!lar~ly 1I"1th cultural evolution. This Is not to 
be found in the animal p.;roupR below mall; but it is the 
distin~uiRhing reature of human social ~roups. All 
possess it, althou~h in varying d~grces and quantity; 
and there has never been a time in the history of human 
groups but what some degree or culture haR been present. 
Culture has slowly evolved, and indeed m!-lst have pro-
ceeded from very simple beginnings to the more complex 
aspects or it which we now rind among civi117.ed mankind. 
During the long period wi thin which culture has been 
slowly evolving certain factors llave unquestionably 
(1). A. G. Keller: Societal Evolution, N. y., 1015, 
p. :10. 
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played a large part. Can it be that any group of 
factors or forces has played the sole part' Let us 
see. 
We "ill first examine the environmental theory 
of cultUre, which insists that the influence of the 
environment, economic and geo~raph1cal, has played the 
determining part. This theory as Dr. Lowie sarcas-
(1) 
t fcally suggests, bears a resemblance t .o the old class-
ical associationist theory which so long prevailed in 
psycholot?:Y· Accord1nl!' to this theory the mind was 
regarded as a sheet of blank paper on which the outer 
world produces impressions; and, accordingly, all of 
the higher Mental activities, in the last analysis, 
are reducible to combinations of sense impressions. 
This theory has been r,fven up in psycholop;y for the 
most . part, but seems to su~gest the viewpoint of the 
environmentalist. As we have seen, the env ironment 
almost wholly controls the life of organisms below 
man; but then no SUb-human group can be said to poss-
ess culture. Although foundations are there, yet 
individual and social evolution has not gone far enough 
to actually produce it. As Professor Ellwood bas 
said, "the wonders of a hive of bees, or of a hill of 
ants, are truly 'social', i.e., they involve psychic 
interstimulation and response, but they are not cultur-
(1). Robert II. Lo"ie: CultUre and Ethnology, N. Y., 
1917, p.47. 
al." The organization found in such aniMal COMMUn-
iti~s has been wholly produced by the biological fac-
tors of heredity, variation and selection, togetJj~r 
with so~e degree of habituation. The necessity for 
defense, nutrition and reproduction rigidly determines 
their entire life cycle. These, togeth~r with the 
selective action of the environment, are the only 
factors that need to be taken into account; for a 
rigid biological and geographical determiniRm complete- , 
ly covers their entire social life. Such a descrip-
tion cannot be at all adequate in accounting for the 
social life of man, (as was pointed out in chapter 
t"o). The acquired conplex activities of man cannot, 
be reduced to either environmental or hiological fac-
tors. 
As Dr. Lowie has pointed out, "th~ utilization 
of part of tile environment, instead of being an auto-
matic response has for an indispensable prerequisite 
(2) 
a certain type of culture." As an illustration of 
tlr:i.s he states Olat the Navajo and Hopi Indians have 
for a long time both occupied the same section of 
~rizona; and, if the environmental theory were true, 
(1). FrOM an article entitled: "Theories of Cultural 
Evolution", unpublls)-iM at the time the above 
was written. Acknowledgement is here l'1ade for 
the free use which the writer haR made of it. 
(2). Ope cit., pp. 48-49. 
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we "oule1 naturally expect to find among them tile same 
sort of culture, but we do not. The liopi Indians 
are agriculturalists and. dwell in stone houses; while 
the Navajo do but littl~ farming and live in conical-
shaped, earth-covered huts. In short, parallels 
between peoples are not due to environmental stimuli, 
but, on the other hand, are due to contact and borrow-
ing. To quote Dr. Lowie again: "Environment cannot 
explain culture because the identical environment 1s 
consist~nt with distinct cultures; because cultural 
traits p~rsist from inertia in an unfavorable environ-
rnent; because they do not develop wh~re they would be 
of distinct advantage to a people; and because they may 
even disappear where one would least expect it on 
(1) 
geographical principles." The environment must be 
regarded as entering into cultUre, not as a forMative 
element which predominates, but rather as an inert 
and plastic element to be selected from and. molded at 
convenience. 
The environmental theory ~isregards that man 
is differentiated from the lower animals by his adap-
tive brain, his power of artiCUlate speech, langtmge 
and invention. Decause of these things human asso-
ciation is essentially different from animal associa-
tion. Thus man is not Merely an anirral among other 
( 1 ). Ib id , p. 62. 
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aniMals, with a greater capacity for habituation; 
but llis mental equipment IJas made it possible for hiM 
to adapt himself to his environment, and to more or 
(1) 
less control it. Since man alone is capable of 
adjusting himself to even unfavorahle environmerits 
through his powers of invention and the like; the ex-
planation and interpretation of his culture 1s not 
to be found in an environmental tht"!ory. To quote 
from Dr. Lowie again: "Gulture can no more be built 
up of env1.ronmental blocks Ulan can consciousness out 
(2) 
of isolated ideas." It is not to be denied that 
tile environr.:ent does furnish part of the material 
which must be used in building and constructing a cul-
ture. It does largely shape and mold the technology 
of a pt"ople; it enters into, colors and influences 
habituation, and the like; but it does not, in the 
broad sense of the term, explain culture. As Dr. 
Lowie says: "The environment furnishes the builders 
of cultural structures with brick and Mortar but it 
u» 
does not furnish the architect's plan." 
To what extent may the biolo~ical factors account 
for culture? Since culture is to be regarded as a 
complex of socially acquired traits, it would seem 
that racial or hereditary structures could not possi-
(1). See I'~ll"ood: l'heories of CuI tural Evolution. 
(2). Low1.e: Ope cit., p. 65. 
(3). Ibid, p. 61. 
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bly have any place in the determination of culture. 
But this is not wholly true. Hereditary character-
istics have been largely brougMabout by organic and 
social evolution, and it may be possible that certain 
races possess more capacity for cultural acquisitions 
than do others. The principle of acquisition, however, 
1 s the same in all cases; for, as Clarlc Wissler says, 
"we fail to discover any essential differences in the 
tools of early man and those now Made in a rational-
istic manner; hence we can do no ~ore than assume that 
(1) 
frOM the first they were inventions." Some races 
would likely prove more capable of invention than others, 
at least that is the way it has actually'worked out in 
civiI17.ation. The white race is biologically better 
fitted for acquirin~ new activities than is the negro 
race, and to that extent race is to be regarded as a 
factor in the acquisition of culture. Primitive )!Ian 
made his inventions in the same manner as does modern 
man, and this makes it appear rather certain that race 
does not count as a dominating factor. ' As Dr. Lowie 
says, "the supposed explanation by racial potentialities 
would be far too general to interpret the actual 
(2) 
}lapp,.nings. " 
(1). ClarYe Wissler: Psycholo~ical and Historical 
Interpretations for Vulture, Science, Vol. XLIII, 
No. 1102, p. 195. 
( 2). Op. cit., p. 4(J. 
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Neither can the psychical ractors or themselves 
wholly account ror culture. Psycholo~y, eTen in 
excursions into the abnormal, or in its introspective 
study or imltvidual variations, dotl's not rully grapple 
with acquired mental traits and with tlte inrluence of' 
society as a whole on individual thought; will and reel-
ing. - Psychology, it is true can give us helprul explan-
ations, but in itselr alone, cannot account ror the 
whole phenomena or culture. The psychical f'actors 
which issue rrom psycholo~y are thus inadequate in 
p.:iving rull and systematic explanations or culture. 
As an illustration or the inadequacy of' the psychical 
explanation lYe can take the tramnnission or tile art of' 
paper manuf'acture. It "as invented by the Chinese, 
borrowed rrom them by the Arabs, and transmitted throu,:!h 
the Arabs to the Europeans. Why did not the Europeans 
borrow it directly f'rom the Chinese? It was bt"'cause 
the Europpans had no knowled~e or the invention or paper 
until they had it cornnunicated to them by the Arabs. 
They did not have direct contact with the Chinese, and, 
therefore, could not become acquainted with the art 
until they became ramiliar with it through their con-
(1) 
tact with the Arabs. Geographical isolation pre-
vented the direct transmission. Geo~raphical isola-
tion, however, cannot always account ror the trans-
mission or culture; i.e., the Hopi Indians or Arizona 
(1). cr. Lowie, ibid, p. 10. 
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had no knowledge of the industrial culture of another 
tribe living only ei~ht miles away. 
Psycholof!;y cannot fully explain the borrowing 
and the transMission of culture because it deals prin-
cipally with the innate traits of the individual. 
Ar:ain, such psychic factors as language, tradition 
and the "mores", while they do account for a great deal 
of the transmission of culture, cannot account for the 
whole phenomena. The cultural phenomena, even when 
considered in their psychological aspect, c~mprises 
something over and abovc the facts which psycholor::y can 
explain. As Dr· Lowie says: "The cultural facts, 
even in their subjective aspect, are not merged in psy-
cltological.facts. They MuSt not, indeed, contravene 
psychological principles, but tlie saT'IC applies to all 
other prtnciples of tIle universe; culture cannot con-
strnct houses contra.ry to the laws of gravitation nor 
produce bread out of stones. But the principles of 
psycholo~y are as inca~able of accounting for the phe-
not~ena of culture as is gravitation to account for 
architecturdl styles. Uver and above the interpre-
tation given by psychology, there is an irreducible 
residuum of hup.:e magnitude that calls for " special 
treatment and by its very existence vindicates the 
(1) 
raison d'etre of ethnolo~y." This does not mean that 
the psychical factors are to be disregarded, but only 
(1). Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
that they alone cannot account for culture. It may be 
that they are the uomlnutinp: set of factors, but they 
are not the sole factors. 
Now let us see if our synthetic theory can account 
for cultural phenomena, wldch Wissler says is to be con-
celved of "as including all of the activities of nnn 
acquired by learning", and which he defines as "the 
(1) 
acquired activity complexes of human groups." The 
problem involved resolves itself into the almost iden-
tical education probleffl of inborn versus acquired 
activities. This problem has been systematically 
discussed by Professor Thorndike in his "Original Nature 
of Man". He tells us that "a child instinctively 
conveys food to his mouth w1 th tIle naked hand, but by 
(2) 
habit co~es to use a spoon." The use of a spoon 
in eating is surely a cultural fact in contrast to the 
use of tile hand. It is thus analo.t!:ous to tIle use 
of tools in general, which 100m so large in the object-
tve phenomena of culture. Not all Instincts found in 
ori~inal human nature are to be regarded as cultural 
facts, as Thorndike admits. lIe seems to conclude 
that while orip:inal nature often demands that an indivi-
dual respond in a certain way to certain stimuli; yet 
it does not always dominate the character and frequency 
(1). Clark Wissler: Ope cit., p. t~5. 
(2). E. L. Thorndike: Orip:inal Nature of Man, p. ~. 
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of response. The individual is endowed at birth with 
only a few hereditarily-deter~ined instinctive possi-
bilities; Many of Ule instinctive resp(!nscs must be 
acquir9d • To quote Wissler a~ain: "While all cul-
ture is acquired, there ~"lst still be a co~plcx or 
instincts to aC'1uire am participate in cultural activ-
itles; but only very rarely, if at all, specific instincts 
(1) 
for the acquisition of a particular culture." 
culture is in content fundamentally icleational; 
i.e., is largely made poss ible throup.:h illeas and the 
connections between theM. This is not found in ori~-
inal hUMan nature, as Thorndike points out. H0 says 
that: "No one has, I think, fo~nd satisfactory evidence 
that, apart from training, an idea leads of :f.nner nec-
essity to anyone response ••••••• We baye, of course, 
by orir.:inal nature tile capacities to connect the idea 
of one thillg to tJle idea of" another thing when tte two 
have been in certain relations, and to break up the idea 
of a total fact into ideas of its elements, when once 
ideas have been ~iven that arc capable of such associa-
tion and analysis. But we do not apparently, by ori~-
inal nature, have prefor~ed honds leadin~ from ideas 
t 0 anythin~. If an idea apart f"rom training provokes 
a resnonse, it does so by virtue of its likeness to so~e 
sensory perception or .emotion. Nor do we apparently 
( 1). 01'. cit., p. 1!-l6. 
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by ori~tnal nature respond to a situation by anyone idea 
rather than another. That we think is due to original 
capacity to associate and analyze, but what we think 
is due to the environmental conditions under which 
(1) 
these capacities work." 
Man has, as we have noted, an inborn capacity 
for tool-makin~. Indeed, it may be said that man 
is by original nature both a tool-using and a tool-
wantinp.: animal. Some anthropologists hold to the 
psychic-accident theory, that man discovered the use of 
tools by accident, and that his innate instinct for 
tools Made it possible for him to seize upon this dls-
covery and utilize it for the benefit of the group. 
But it is much more likely thut some especially gifted 
individual discovered a new w~y of doing things in a 
rational manner; i.e., throuP.'h the medium of the trial 
and error method. Thus this invention, or the pro-
duction of the new traits of culture, must itself be 
rationalized, as is the case when we deliberately set 
ourselves an inventive task, or even when we rcco~rrize 
the inventive process as a method of culture production. 
New conceptions must COMe as the normal, undirected 
activity of thought. Hence the power of rationali-
zation Must also have been a part of man's ori~tnal 
nature. It has been shown by anthropologists that 
(1). Thorndike: op. cit., p. 21. 
112 
many forms of stone tools are but gli~ht mod:fficatlons 
of selecteu. pebbles, whose natural shapes were adaptoo 
to the spec ific purpose for whicl~ tools were sout!;ht. 
Let us take for example -the J!Ialcing of a flaked stone 
iMplement. When once formed this new iMplement would 
serve as a "pattern" for the other members of the group. 
By anu. by another t!;ifted individual would iJ!lprove unon 
this former il!1plement, and he in turn would cOJ!lnlunicate 
hts invent10n to the ~roup, who would use it as a "pat-
tern" for their use. Thus culture JTIust have been 
in its orie:in a mat t er of 1dt"as tn which t}le rat ional1.-
(1) 
zing mechanism functions. the first requisite for 
such a process would be the appearance of an anthro-
poid po~sessing this rationalizing element as part of 
Ills oril!i.nal nature. ~~s Wiss ler says: "The forMS and 
varieties of cultural remains sct"m to necessit~te frOM 
the first the existence of this rationalizin~ power at 
its present level ••••• Anthropologists favor the view 
that no Mechanical movement complexes for tool-rnaJclng 
are innate, but that there is In man·s ori~inal na-
t ure a t!1echanism that lays hold of tJlinp-'s and thus 
supplies the basis for self-rationalization (tile 
ra t ioc lnat ion process) and for tIle aCfluisi t ion of the 
~reat store of aCCUMulated rationalizations of the 
(2) 
race, or culture." 
(1). Cf. Ellwood: Theories of Cultural Evolution. 
( 2). Op. c It ., p. 200. 
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Culture 1.s to be explained in terms of its~lf' -
"omnia cultur~ ex cultura". TlJUs a cultural f'act 
i~ to be accounted for by merging it in a I!;roup of 
cultural fucts, or by demonstrating SOMe other cul-
tural fact out of 'Thich it has developed. Culture, 
as wc have seen, is largely the result of' invention 
and is made possible by the ratiocination process. 
What are the determinants of culture? They come about 
largely throup.;JI the dirfusion and contact of peoples. 
As GudMund Hat t says: "It is anci has always ueen Much 
casier to bOrl""Olf an ilea from one's neighbors than to 
ori~inate a new idea; ant! transmission of' cultural ele-
ments, which in all ages has taken place in a great nany 
different ways, is and ahvays has been one of' the ~rea t-
(1) 
est nror.Joters of cultural llevelopmf'nt." TIl is is 
illustra.ted by the success the .JaTlanese have attain("d 
in the taking over' of Occiciental civilization. Again, 
the first colonists in AMerica took over tI'e maize 
culture in its entirety without any Modifications wh..tt-
ever. Transmission has also followed the trade routes. 
Etruscan vases have been found all of the way from the 
I 
Daltic to the mainland of Asia, hut principally along 
the anci~nt trade routes of the Danube Valley. Again, 
amber bcails have bcen found not only in Swiss pilc-
dlfclltn~s, but also in Mycenean ruins of thc secont! 
(1). Moccasins and their Relation to Arctic Foot-wcdr. 
!tfeJl'loirs, A~er .... lnthro. Assn., Vol. III, No.3, 
p. 216. 
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millenium n. C. The nronze culture which orl~tnated 
aroun.i the Meuiterr ... nean basin found its way northward 
and was the principal a~ent in transfornlin%!: the Scan-
dinavians of the far north of Europe from a state of 
s~vagery to one of e~li~htened civilization. The 
contact of peoples in the old "orlll Made civilization 
possihle, as one peo",le would borrow fro"'! anoUler, 
and various cultural tec)molo~y and inst1 tut ions ,,'ere 
thus diffused. Since U!e agl'icul t ural teclmolol!Y, 
rastor~l Inuustry, anu pottery of botl: the Chinese amI. 
Babylonians ar-e somewhat anulOJr,ollS, anthl"opolo~ists 
arc leu to believe that both cultures are ramiftca-
(1) 
tions from a COJ'lJnon .. lstattc sUb-stratum. 
The contact of peoples has led to a free exchange 
of arts and ideas, and has succeeded in Md.kill~ tl~e:l.r 
culture siMilar. But before peoples can commmlcate 
their culture, they Must first evolve it. Thts CO"1CS 
ahout throu.e;h the attainment of a cO!!lnlex of acquired 
activities. One generation learns frOM the one pre-
ce.ling It, anl frolYJ otl'er peoples. Culture thus be-
comes . a "learnjn~ process". It is transmitted through 
heredity (race), the influences of the economic and 
geo~raphtcal environMent, and the psychic~l factors of 
lan~ua~e, invention and tradition. . Each new gene ra t i on 
(1). Robert II. Lowie: r,ul tUre anll Etlmolop.;y, p. 76. 
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is born witll thc innate capacity for taking on culture, 
but as it is an ac~utsition of aC1uired activity con-
plex~s, its attainment is essentially a "learning 
process". Thus all of these f'actors cooperate in 
nakin~ culture possihle. Xo one set of factors is 
capable of accountill~ for th~ whole phenoMena, but 
all taken together form a synthctic whole which explains 
culture 1n its entirety. These factors are social 
{'orces, which in their interplay uJlon hUMan groups 
hd.ve lfrour.:ht the fabric of culture or civilization. 
Instinct ively Man \fas a tool-Mal(ing and a tool-u[ilng 
aniMal, with an inndte capacity for invention. Tnven-
t ion, throu~h 'flItch man has controlled the forces of 
the cnvironrJcnt amI harnessed. them to his usc, Made 
imlustry posstble, amI upon industry lIas bf'('n reared 
tile whole structure of civilization. ArtiCUlate 
speech and lan~ua~e must have been coeval with the 
evolution of technology. Throu.!!:h lan!!uae;e and the 
contact of peoples, knowledge and skill were transMitt-
ci, aml have brol1~ht ahout tIle btrth of science, art, 
Morality, religion, government - in brief, all of the 
lJUYnd.n achievements and institutions which m.A.ke up the 
subst •. mce and content of culture. 
rn thus reducin~ the origin and develonnent of 
culture to "a learn1np.: 'Process", throu~h the aC1uist-
tion of acquired activity complexes, we can easily sec 
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how these would tend to becoT'le "Mores", and be handed 
down from generation to genprdtion. This brings us 
a little closer to the startin~ point of both SUMner 
and '(eller, hut our statement is f)PrhaTls More Jefinj te. 
Thus the connection existin~ between the "mores" and 
"culture" is at once apparent. The principles invol-
veJ. in tile evolution of cultUre al'e variation, '3e]ect10n, 
transmission and adaptation. 
If there were no variations in the "mores" there 
would be little or no diversity in human customs and 
institutions. As we stucly exlstin,2; society we at 
once see that no two groups, families, fraternjties, 
religious sects, or political units have the same set 
of "mores". nut accordin~ to our theory of the devel-
nnmcnt of culture as a learning nroccss there is ample 
room for d tvers i ty in the mores. In oUler '\forLls, the · 
development of culture proceeus independently, at least 
to some extent. The Mores of a people are affected 
l)y their env1 ronMcnt and their heredi ty, which account 
for SOT!le of tlle variation which \fe find • 
• AS Men aC1uired new habi ts throup:h new inven-
tions, there came to be selection from among the mores; 
and this selection tenueu to limit the v~riation of the 
mores. There would come to be a certain amount of 
uniformity in the practice of certd.in mores, throU1~h 
the follo*ing of cert~in "pattQrn ide~s", and findlly 
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those Mores which were deeMed essential to ~roup wel-
fare would come to receive soctal and reltr.;tous sanc-
tion, and would heCOMe the "Mores" of the grnu'!'l. The 
place which religious approval has held in the forma-
tion of the mores of a !!roup has indeed been great. 
It has perhaps been the ~redtest factor or all, be-
cause when religious sanction attaches itself to a 
custom it continues even after it has outlived its 
usefulness to the group. Some of this selection has 
gone on autol:1d. t Ica 1ty as determined la r~ely by environ-
~lental and racial factors. But final selection has 
proceeJed rationally. Rational selection has de-
pended upon the fitness, or unfitness, the rightness, 
or wrongness of the Mores whpn considered for the 
benefit of tile wlwle J!;roup. Thus selection has COMe 
about throug}1 the ratiocination process. 
Transmission has come about through the inter-
play of various forces, such as hereJity, speech, 
lan~uaJ!;e, tr.:t:iltion, education, imitation, etc. In 
the past cultures Jlave been largely interwoven; and 
indeed, there is not a s1n~le culture anywhere that 
has not been affected to sone extent by other cultures. 
The Chinese are seemingly an exception; but if the view 
of modern anthropolo~y is correct the Chinese came into 
China about1,OO() years ago frOM the steppes of dsia, 
where they had come into contiJ.ct with the Babylonian 
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and Egyptian cultures, and had aClJuired some of' the 
mores of' these groups. In seclusion the"Chinese 
invented gunpowder, the printin~ nress ami the compass; 
but they used them Merely as toys, and did not rut 
them to practical use, especially using the compass 
as chil,tren would 
-
to guide them about the streets, 
totally f'ailing to use it f'or its main use 
-
namely, 
navit!ation. 'lhroup.;h war-lUre raids and invasions, 
one culture was transmitted and f'u!';ed with another. 
In many cases the conquering group becaMe the ruling 
class and took up some of the mores of the conquered 
group, substituting some of their own, and imposing 
theM upon the conquered peoples. 
Adaptation represents the final selection after 
variation and tranSMission have gone on indefinitely. 
Through a More or less flexible adaptation institutions 
may be transplanted from one people to another, and " 
modif'ied to fit the new need. A strtk1n~ illustra-
tion of' this adaptation is seen in the institutions of' 
our own country. For instance, we have borrowed ethics 
and reli~ion from the Hebrews; philo!';ophy, art and 
education f'rom the Greeks; government and law rrom the 
nomans; and the doctrine or individual liberty rrom 
the Teutons. 
Thus in its final outcome culture is essentially 
"a learning process", which is made possible because 
there exists in the original nature of man a mechanism 
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that makes rational thinking and r~tionaladaptation 
possible. Thus Man is capable of acquiring the 
p:;reat store of accumulated knowledge of the race, -
all of those things which l"Iake up thE" sUbstance and 
sum total of human achievement. It is a learning 
process in which no one set of social forces functions 
to the exclusion of the others; but all are combined 
and synthetized in the attainment of the final ~oal -
civilization. The environmental and biological 
forces, reacted upon and util tzed l)y thE" psychic"l 
forces, and th~ whole ~uided and in large Me~sure 
controlled by human reason have wrought the warf and 
woof of civilization. 
SIDfMARY 
In sU1m!larizing our theory of the social forces, 
we Must necessarily form some certain definite con-
clusions. The social forces are not one but-many. 
No monistic theory of the social forces can stand 
because unscientific and inade~uate. Similarly 
tIle stressin~ of a single ~roup of forces is also 
ina<iequate bec~use it fail!,; to ta!m into consideration 
the whole phen01"lena of culture. Metaphysicul do~ma 
has no place in the statem~nt of an adequd.te theory of 
the social forces; because, as we have seen, true 
sci~nce has no room for metaphysical dogMa and specula-
• 
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tion. A scientific statement of the social forces 
necessurily gives each set of factors its proper 
place, but does not do~tically assert that these 
factors are in themselves sufficient to account for 
social ~henoMena. A thorough-going objectivism is 
also undesirable because social phenol!1ena are as yet 
so little understood that to' describe the social behav-
ior of manldnd in terms of stimuli and respon~e would 
only serve to cloud and obscure the issue. 
The environmental forces whlr.h are primarily 
the effect upon the orgd.ni~m of the r;eographical and 
economic environment, while they practically account 
for all of the activities of the lower organisms, can-
not account for all of the complex social activities 
of man. They play an important part to be sure, 
but not the whole part, in the social behavior of 
human individuals and human society. 
The biolo~ical factors of heredity, variation 
and selection can only give the hUman or~anism the 
equipment with which it be,gins life; they do not deter-
mine the futUre career of either the individual or the 
group. A~y adequate theory of heredity must be a 
combination of Mendelian heredity and lfeisl'lann's theory 
of the germ-plasm. It must, accordin~ly, regard 
mankind as being equi""ped with certain hereditarily 
determIned instinctive adjustments which can be rnodl-
151 
ried urtcr birth, but the biolo~ical factors cannot 
be regarded as the dominant ructors in social lire. 
The psychical factors play an important part 
in th~ individua.l and social life of mankind. The 
habits, feelings, and intellectual clements are not 
reducible to either environmental or hiolo~ical forces. 
Un the other hand~ they probably play a more or less 
dominant role in the determining of social relation-
ship arnon~ civilized human beings. The part played 
by centrally initiated nervous processes seems to 
indicate tha.t the intellect or reason plays the domi-
nant part in the detcrmining of the social life of both 
the indivi(lual and the group. Consciousness is not 
a non-entity, as some have urged, but is very much a 
~act, as the Freudian pSYCho-analysis has demonstrated. 
On the whole the psychical factors must continue to 
occupy a very important place in any adequate statement 
of the social forces. 
The psychical factors, or forces, as wc have 
seen In our examination of the evolution of culture, 
are not to be emphasized to the exclusion of other 
forces. All of these different sets of rorces, 
environmpntal, biological, " and psychical must be com-
bined into a synthetic whole, if an adequate and 
scientitic theory of the social forces is to be obtained. 
In the evolution of culture, which we viewed as cssen-
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tially "a learnin~ process" made possible through 
the acquisition of acquired activity complexes, all of 
these different .sets of forces Must function. Any 
dogmatic or metaphysical assul'Iptions which seek to 
reduce the social forces to anyone ractor or ~roup 
of factors are thus to be regarded as both unsound and 
unscientific. A theory which inclucles them all am 
synthetizes the whole is, therefore, to be regArded as 
a sound theory of the social forces, and must, accord-
ingly, form "the cornerstone of sociology". 
TilE END 
· . 
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